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                                                        SUMMARY  
 
If the expectancy that someone was to act according to what we deem to be his or her “duty” 
was that straightforward, there would be no need to address the issues of liability of the 
employee for the wrongful acts of the employer. The recent - and some say alarming - trend 
in South Africa to hold employers (particularly the government) liable for wrongful, culpable 
acts committed by their employees, gives rise to difficulties and any inquiry into the possible 
vicarious liability of the employer should necessarily always start by asking whether there 
was in fact a wrongful, culpable act committed by the employee. If not, there can neither be 
direct liability of the employee nor vicarious liability by the employer. Where the employee did 
indeed commit a delict, the relationship between the wrongdoer and his or her employer at 
the time of the wrongdoing becomes important. It is then often, in determining whether the 
employee was acting in the scope of his or her employment that normative issues come to 
the fore. Over the years South African courts have devised tests to determine whether an 
employee was in fact acting in the scope of his employment. 
 
 
 
Title of thesis: 
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                                                      CHAPTER 1 
                                                   INTRODUCTION 
 
The requirements for the vicarious liability of an employer are threefold: an employment 
relationship, the commission of a delict, and the fact that the delict must have been 
committed within the scope (sometimes course and scope) of employment.1 The last 
requirement ensures that there is a measure of fairness towards the employer who is held 
strictly liable. Courts in common law countries have grappled with the question under which 
circumstances an act would be within the scope of employment, especially in the case of 
intentional wrongdoing by the employee. Courts in Canada, the United Kingdom and 
Australia have in recent times moved away from a strict interpretation of the scope of 
employment and applied the ‘close connection’ test2 to answer this question. This trend has 
been followed in South Africa by the Constitutional Court in NK v Minister of Safety and 
Security (hereafter the ‘NK case’).3 The Constitutional Court developed the close connection 
test to reflect constitutional values, which raises questions on how this test is to be applied to 
cases in which constitutional rights and duties are less prominent. The aim of this thesis is to 
examine the meaning of the close connection test as formulated by the Constitutional Court 
against the background of the development of the test in those common law countries 
referred to above. It commences with a discussion of the NK, followed by an assessment of 
the origin of the close connection test and its development in common law countries. 
Thereafter the meaning of the test as applied by the Constitutional Court is analysed, and its 
applicability to those cases where constitutional rights and duties are less prominent is 
discussed. South African cases decided after the NK case is then examined, and in 
conclusion some remarks are made on the possible application of the test in future. 
 
_____________ 
1   Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382 390. 
2   Lister v Hesley Hall [2001] UKHL 22 para 25. 
3    2005 26 ILJ 1205 (CC) 
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The objective of this research was to discover what constitutes vicarious liability in the 
workplace as same is a controversial topic. It is prevalent in every country around the world, 
and seems to be occurring more frequently here in South Africa with every passing year. 
 
As we struggle to overcome previously entrenched social and cultural mores and practises, 
the incidence of an employee causing misfortune and damage to third parties is becoming 
ever more apparent. Whether this represents an increase in the occurrence of the damage 
itself, or merely a rise in the number of reported cases, the problem represents a growing 
threat to South African employers. 
 
In turn, this represents the South African employer with a proportionately even greater risk. 
After all the employer is the one who will, at the end of the day, most likely be liable for 
paying the heavy financial cost of dealing with the problem.  
The incidence of vicarious liability seems to be increasing in South Africa. 
 
In this dissertation I have sought to clarify the notion of liability for vicarious liability as it 
relates to the employer. The different avenues open to an employer are, in essence, related 
to the practical considerations of where the third party is most likely to obtain the relief 
necessary to assuage the damage caused by the employee. Such damage also causes 
physical and psychological stresses brought about by the actions of the employee. The 
concepts of direct and vicarious liability are examined from statutory and common law 
perspectives, taking into account the relevant case law and more specifically Constitutional 
Court case law. 
 
It was important to compare the concept of vicarious liability in relation to the interpretation 
thereof in other countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, as vicarious 
liability has traditionally been founded upon no more than the existence of the employment 
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relationship – thus directing the enquiry only to whether the wrongdoer was engaged in the 
affairs or business of his or her employer when the delictual act was committed – recent 
cases in Canada and England reflect a principal shift by introducing into the enquiry duties 
on the part of the employer. Such cases all concern an intentional act of employees which 
are usually difficult to conceive as having been committed within the course of the 
wrongdoer’s employment as being improper modes of doing an act authorized by the 
employer. 
Formal duty, in the form of employment, often defines an individual. It is not uncommon to 
refer to someone as “John the architect” or to introduce a friend by saying: “Ingrid is a 
writer.” This close association between an individual’s name and his or her occupation is 
indicative of society’s expectations that people will generally act in accordance with their 
duties, training and expertise. Members of the public would be justified in their expectation 
that police on stand-by duty would not harm them, but protect them. It is to be expected that 
a police officer is to behave like a police officer should.  
 
Vicarious liability in terms of the relationship between employer and employee is an ever 
increasing drain on the resources of the modern employer and, takes up much time in terms 
of legal battles and court cases. The concept of vicarious liability has undergone much 
revision over the past decades. 
 
The Constitution protects and enshrines important rights like dignity, equality and the right to 
fair labour practices. These are further defined and protected through the application of 
various statutes. In terms of statutory liability, the employer will be liable for the illegal act(s) 
of its employees, unless it takes a proactive stance and implements comprehensive 
precautionary measures in order to avoid such liability by employing honest, honourable, well 
qualified employees. In this way the employer will at least have a clear conscience when held 
liable for the actions of his or her employee and even escape liability.  
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The common law vicarious liability of the employer cannot be escaped as easily. The entire 
concept of the law of delict is to remedy harm suffered. In terms of the common law, 
employers will be held vicariously liable for the act of their employees if it can be shown that 
the act(s) occurred within a valid working relationship, if the act(s) actually occurred through 
a delict, and if the act occurred within the course and scope of employment.  
 
Vicarious liability in English law is a doctrine of English tort law that imposes strict liability on 
employers for the wrongdoings of their employees. Generally, an employer will be held liable 
for any tort committed while an employee is conducting their duties. This liability has 
expanded in recent years to better cover intentional torts. Historically, it was held that most 
intentional wrongdoings were not in the course of ordinary employment, but recent case law 
suggests that where an action is closely connected with an employee's duties, an employer 
can be found vicariously liable.  
Historical tests centered around finding control between a supposed employer and an 
employee, in a form of master and servant relationship. The control test effectively imposed 
liability where an employer dictated both what work was to be done, and how it was to be 
done.  
This dissertation reflects on the requirements for and constitutionality of vicarious liability. In 
order to achieve a logical rationale it is inevitable to discuss and compare those principles, 
decisions and concepts formulated in foreign countries. 
Decisions of the Constitutional Court will be used in support of explanations contained 
herein. The principles and requirements laid down and accepted over the past hundred years 
by foreign courts will be used in comparison and support of explanations contained herein.  
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                                                   CHAPTER 2 
 
CHAPTER 2.1  
 
THE DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN NK V MINISTER OF SAFETY             
AND SECURITY 
 
The NK case4 concerned a claim by a woman, the applicant, who in the early hours of the 
morning was stranded without transport. She tried to phone her mother from a garage shop 
to ask her to come and fetch her when three policemen on duty at the time, in uniform and in 
a marked police vehicle, offered to take her home and she readily accepted. On the way to 
her home they took a wrong turn and stopped somewhere, where all three of them raped her. 
She was left to find her own way home. The policemen were delictually liable for their 
conduct, but that was not the issue in this case. 
The policemen were subsequently tried and convicted and the applicant thereafter sued for 
damages. The High Court dismissed the applicant’s claim against the Minister in terms of the 
vicarious liability of the Minister and she appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal5 dismissed the appeal on the basis that the acts of the 
policemen could not be regarded as having been done within the course and scope of their 
employment. The Court stated that difficulty often arises in the so-called deviation cases in 
which the employer could still be held liable even though the employee deviated from 
instructions, but in such cases the question was: 
  
‘... whether the deviation was of such a degree that it can be said that in doing what he or she did the 
employee was still exercising functions to which he or she had been appointed or was still carrying out 
some instruction of his or her employer’.6  
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
4     K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 26 ILJ 681 (SCA) (due to differences in the way in which the 
     name of the case was reported in the ILJ, the CC Judgment will be referred to as the NK case and the  
     SCA judgment as the K case). 
5     Para 4. 
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This reasoning relied on past South African cases which held that deviation from authorised 
duties should not be too drastic. If so, the act would not fall within the scope of employment.6 
The Supreme Court of Appeal declined to develop the common law test for vicarious liability 
to reflect the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution, as urged by counsel for the 
applicant. The Court held that it is:  
‘... unnecessary to consider the question of the development of the law which in any event would best be 
dealt with by the legislature should a change in law be considered necessary.’7 
 
On appeal, the Constitutional Court held that the common law doctrine of vicarious liability 
should be developed to reflect the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution. The Court 
held that in the light of the policy considerations8 on which the doctrine of vicarious liability is 
based and the normative influence of the Constitution, it cannot be asserted, as the courts 
did in the past, that it is purely a factual matter whether a certain act falls within the scope of 
employment. This would in effect sterilise the common law rules of vicarious liability, and 
isolate them from the pervasive normative influence of the Constitution.9 
The Court stated that the most important policy considerations which form the basis of the 
vicarious liability of an employer are ‘efficacious remedies’ for harm suffered and to ‘incite 
employers to take active steps to prevent their employees from harming members of the 
broader community;’10 in short, the policy considerations of adequate compensation and 
deterrence. The Court added that there is also a countervailing principle namely that 
‘damages should not be borne by employers in all circumstances, but only in those 
circumstances in which it is fair to require them to do so.’11 
 
 
______________ 
6    See the minority decision in Feldman v Mall 1945 AD 733 (hereafter ‘Feldman’) and  
    Viljoen v Smith 1997 1 SA 309 (A) (hereafter ‘Viljoen’). 
7    K case supra para 8. 
8   These are similar to the policy considerations considered to be the basis for vicarious   
     liability in Bazley v Curry 1999 2 SCR 534 (hereafter ‘Bazley’). 
9     NK case para 22 . 
10   Para 21. 
11   ibid. 
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The Constitutional Court held that statements by South African courts12 that the reason for 
the rule must not be confused with the rule itself, and that the application of common law 
principles of vicarious liability remains a matter of fact, could not be correct.13  
The Constitutional Court’s dictum that the underlying policy considerations are relevant to the 
rule is in accordance with the decision in Feldman,14 in which the Court stated that the 
examination of the basis for the rule (risk) assists in establishing the limits of the employer’s 
liability.15 The courts in Bazley16 and Grobler v Naspers (hereafter the ‘Grobler case’),17 to 
mention only two, also investigated the reason for the rule to assist in establishing the scope 
of the employer’s vicarious liability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
12     See, eg, the judgment in Ess Kay Electronics v First National Bank 2001 1 SA 1214     
       (SCA).  
13    NK case para 22 . 
14    1945 AD 733. 
15    741. 
16    Supra para 26. 
17     2004 4 SA 220 (C) 278. 
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CHAPTER 2.2 
AN OMISSION CAN BRING ABOUT A CLOSE CONNECTION 
 
The Constitutional Court relied on Feldman18 in holding that a deviation from authorised 
duties, which is in effect neglect of a duty, could in certain circumstances be closely 
connected to the employment. This would be the case if the omission led to mismanagement 
of the master’s affairs and this in turn led to damages to the third party.19 The employer could 
thus be liable for the intentional wrongdoing if this had a negative impact on the employee’s 
duties, but not if the third party suffered damages as a result of an act of the employee 
unconnected to the work of his employer. 
The Court in the NK case relied on the reasoning in Feldman to indicate that an employer 
can be held liable for acts of the employee done in the employee’s own interest and not in 
furtherance of the employer’s work if the act led to a negligent or improper performance of 
the employer’s work.  
The Constitutional Court thus did not agree with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s reasoning in 
the same case that the greater the deviation, the less justification there can be for holding the 
employer liable.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
18    Supra. 
19    NK case paras 47-48. 
20    Para 5. 
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    CHAPTER 2.3 
 
THE CLOSE CONNECTION TEST FORMULATED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The close connection test as formulated in the United Kingdom entails that the courts ask 
whether a close link exists between the wrongful conduct of the employees and the business 
of the employer or the nature of the employment.21 The Constitutional Court has held that this 
test is very similar to the test formulated in the South African case of Minister of Police v 
Rabie22 (hereafter ‘Rabie’) In the Rabie case an off-duty policeman in plain clothes arrested 
and assaulted an innocent member of the public against whom he had a personal grudge 
and laid a false charge against the person. The Court in Rabie23 formulated the test for 
vicarious liability as follows: 
‘It seems clear that an act done by a servant solely for his own interests and purposes, although 
occasioned by his employment, may fall outside the course or scope of his employment, and 
that in deciding whether an act of a servant does so fall, some reference is to be made to the 
servant’s intention… The test in this regard is subjective. On the other hand, if there is 
nevertheless a sufficiently close link between the servant’s act for his own interests and 
purposes and the business of his master, the master may yet be liable. This is an objective test 
...’ 
 
 
Subsequent to the Rabie case, the above test, consisting of a subjective and objective part, 
was applied in various South African cases,24 although not in all cases on vicarious liability.25 
The Constitutional Court held that if the intention of the employee was not to further his or 
her employer’s business (a subjective test), the master could still be vicariously liable if there 
was a sufficiently close link between the acts of the employee for his own interests and the 
purposes and business of the employer (an objective test). This connection, the Court 
reasoned, had two elements. It is not merely a factual question as was sometimes argued 
 
__________________ 
21    Lister v Hesley Hall supra. 
22   1986 1 SA 117 (A). 
23   Supra 134. 
24    Eg, in Grobler v Naspers supra and Viljoen v Smit (an older case) supra. 
25    Commissioner for the SA Revenue Service v TFN Diamond Cutting works 2005 26 ILJ 1391 (SCA). 
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in South African courts,26 but also a legal question, thus a question of mixed fact and law.27 
The Court did not go into the question of what would factually constitute a close connection. 
Presumably this is the easy part of the close connection, meaning closeness to the 
employment or authorised acts of the employee. It would probably include acts which on the 
surface are similar to the employment of the employee, such as doing the wrongful act while 
doing authorised acts, or acts closely resembling authorised acts, and in the time and the 
place where the employee has to do his or her job. 
The answer to what would constitute a legally close connection is more complicated. This is 
the new element in the close connection test formulated by the Constitutional Court,28 which 
explained its application as follows: 
‘The objective element of the test relates to the connection between the deviant conduct and the 
employment, approached with the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution in mind, is 
sufficiently flexible to incorporate not only constitutional norms, but other norms as well. It 
requires a court when applying it to articulate its reasoning for its conclusions as to whether 
there is a sufficient connection between the wrongful conduct and the employment or not. Thus 
developed, by the explicit recognition of the normative content of the objective stage of the test, 
its application should not offend the Bill of Rights or be at odds with our constitutional order.’ 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________ 
26    Ess Kay Electronics v First National Bank supra paras 9-10. 
27    NK case para 45. 
28   This aspect will be discussed below. 
29    NK case para 44. Interestingly, the close connection test applied by the courts in Canada  
     and the UK, although allowing room for policy considerations, does not incorporate any  
     human rights issues.  
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CHAPTER 2.4 
 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE CLOSE CONNECTION TEST AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN 
COMMON LAW   COUNTRIES 
 
The close connection requirement for vicarious liability has its origin in the so-called 
Salmond-rule: 
‘A master is not responsible for a wrongful act done by his servant unless it is done by his 
servant in the course of his employment. It is deemed to be so done if it is either (a) a wrongful 
act authorized by the master, or (b) a wrongful and unauthorized mode of doing some act 
authorized by the master.’30 
 
Salmond31 further stated that: 
‘A master is liable even for acts which he has not authorized provided that they are so connected with 
acts which he has authorized that they might rightly be regarded as modes – although improper 
modes – of doing them.’ 
 
Courts in common law countries acknowledged that intentional wrongdoing does not fit 
comfortably in the mould of the Salmond rule, as it was difficult to conceive that intentional 
misconduct could be an ‘improper mode’ of doing authorised acts.32 Conduct of this type has 
often been held to constitute independent acts falling outside the scope of employment.33 
However, courts have in recent years increasingly concentrated on the last part of the 
Salmond formulation, namely the connection with authorised acts and taking a less narrow 
view of authorised acts to accommodate intentional wrongdoing.34 
The difficulty is that the close connection test as applied by different courts does not always 
have the same meaning. 
The Canadian case of Bazley v Curry35 concerned a warden of a school for troubled boys 
who sexually abused some of them. The question which the Supreme Court of Canada had 
to answer was whether the employer could be held liable for these acts, which were the 
antithesis of what a person in the position of the warden was employed to do.  
__________________ 
30   See Heuston & Buckley (eds) Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts 21 ed (1996) 443. 
31    Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts 443. 
32    Lister v Hesley Hall supra para 20. 
33    Trotman v North Yorkshire CC 1999 LGR 584 CA (hereafter Trotman). 
34    Rose v Plenty 1976 1 All ER 97 (hereafter Rose). 
35    Supra. 
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The argument for the defence was that these acts could hardly be seen as ‘modes’ of doing 
an unauthorised act. According to the defence, the acts fell outside the Salmond formulation 
and thus outside the range of acts for which the employer could be held liable. 
McClaghlin J for the majority, stated that courts should openly confront the question of 
whether the liability should lie against the employer, rather than obscuring the decision 
beneath semantic discussions of ‘scope of employment’ and ‘mode of conduct.’36 
The Court further stated that the fundamental question is whether the wrongful act is 
sufficiently related to conduct authorised by the employer to justify the imposition of vicarious 
liability. According to the Court, vicarious liability is generally appropriate where there is a 
significant connection between the creation or enhancement of risk and the wrong that 
accrues there from. The Court reasoned that where this is the case, holding the employer 
liable, will serve to fulfill policy considerations, the first of which would be providing an 
adequate and just remedy to the victim. Equally important was the notion that by holding the 
employer liable, the second policy consideration of deterrence would be met, namely 
encouraging of the employer to take preventative measures to guard against wrongdoing by 
employees.37 
The following factors would, according to the Court,38 indicate that there is a significant risk 
that the wrongful act would take place: 
• the opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or her power; 
• the extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the employer’s aims; 
• the extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, confrontation or intimacy 
inherent in the enterprise; 
• the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to the victim; and 
• the vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful exercise of the employee’s power. 
 
___________ 
36    Para 41. 
37    Ibid. 
38    Ibid. 
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The test in the Bazley case39 could be criticised on the ground that the liability of an employer 
would be too wide if risk is regarded as the basis for liability. This would mean that the 
employer would in effect become an insurer. However, the Court was aware of this danger 
and stated that a wrong that is only coincidentally linked to the activity of the employer 
cannot justify the imposition of vicarious liability on the employer. 
The judgment in Jacobi v Griffith40 in which the test formulated by McClaghlin J in the Bazley 
case was applied, did not result in the employer being held liable. In this case, children at a 
youth club were under the supervision of an employee in charge of recreational activities. 
The employee invited two of the children to his house, where acts of sexual abuse took 
place. The Canadian Supreme Court held that the employer was not vicariously liable as the 
employee was not placed in a special position of trust and power with respect to the 
children.41 His position did not significantly increase the risk that such abuse would take 
place.42 The children did not live at the club, could go home at any time and did not have to 
go to the employee’s house.43 The employee’s duties did not include ‘parenting activities’ that 
usually include intimate care as was the case in the Bazley decision. The Supreme Court of 
Canada held in the Jacobi case that the employer was not vicariously liable as the 
connection between the acts of the employee and the risk created by the employer’s 
business was not sufficiently close. The mere opportunity provided by his employment was 
not sufficient to establish a close connection.44 
In Lister v Hesley Hall,45 a warden of a school for boys with emotional and behavioural 
problems sexually abused some of the boys. The House of Lords quoted the decision in 
Bazley with approval and applied the close connection test. However, the Court did not base 
its decision on  a close connection between the acts of the employee and the risk created by 
________________________________ 
39    Supra para 36. 
40    1999 2 SCR 570. 
41     Jacobi v Griffiths supra para 83. 
42    Para 79. 
43     Para 80. 
44     Para 81. 
45    Supra. 
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the employer’s business. Lord Steyn, for the majority, simply required a close connection 
between the acts of the employee and the employment (or authorised acts of the 
employee).46 This test seems to focus on factual closeness, as Lord Steyn 47 remarked: 
‘[T]here is a very close connection between the torts of the warden and his employment. After all, they 
were committed in the time and on the premises of the employers, while the warden was also caring for 
the children.’ 
 
Lord Clyde 48 stated that: 
‘... the care and safekeeping of the boys had been entrusted [to him and] his position as warden and the 
close contact with the boys which that work involved created a sufficient connection between the acts of 
abuse which he committed and the work which he had been employed to do’. 
 
 
In a concurring judgment, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough declined to follow the risk-based 
test in the Bazley case but held the employer liable on the ground of a breach of a special 
(delegated) duty that the employer had towards the victims.49 He stopped short of finding the 
employer liable on a non-delegable duty.50 
The close connection test as applied in Lister v Hesley Hall (as opposed to the test applied in 
the Bazley case), in requiring that the conduct must have a close link with authorised 
conduct, still clings to a strict interpretation of the Salmond test and thus to acts that were 
authorised. A further problem is that it does not give guidance on when the close connection 
requirement will be satisfied. In the Bazley case51 the Court at least gave a list of factors that 
would indicate that the enterprise enhanced the risk that the wrongful act would take place. 
However, there may be little difference between a close connection between the wrongful 
acts of the employee and acts authorised by the employer (the test in the Lister case) and 
between the wrongful acts of the employee and the risk posed by his employment (the test in   
__________________________ 
46   Para 20. 
47    Ibid. 
48    Para 50. 
49    Para 57. 
50   See the discussion of the nature of a non-delegable duty in the Australian Supreme Court in New South Wales  
     v Lepore; Samin v Queensland; Rich v Queensland 2003 HCA 4 infra. 
51   Supra. 
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the Bazley case). To come to a decision on whether there was a close connection of the 
wrongful act to the risk, the court will have to take the employment or duties of the employee 
into consideration and there would be little difference between this and authorised acts. 
In New South Wales v Lepore; Samin v Queensland; Rich v Queensland,52 the High Court of 
Australia examined the possibility that the employers (educational authorities) owed a non-
delegable duty to the child-victims who were assaulted by their teachers. A non-delegable 
duty is one which, if breached, would lead to personal liability for the employer, as the duty 
cannot be discharged by delegation.53 This liability is similar to vicarious liability in that it also 
does not require fault.54 Only one55 of the seven judges held that the educational authority 
was liable on account of a non-delegable duty. The majority of the judges held that a non-
delegable duty was not appropriate in the case of intentional wrongdoing. 
In regard to the close connection test, Gleeson J56 said the following: 
‘[T]he considerations that would justify a conclusion as to whether an enterprise materially increases the 
risk of an employee’s offending would also bear upon the nature of the employee’s responsibilities, which 
are regarded as central in Australia.’ 
 
 
Gleeson J57 emphasised that the specific duties of a teacher should be scrutinised to 
establish whether there would be a close connection between the wrongful act and the 
employment: 
‘The degree of power and intimacy in the teacher-student relationship must be assessed by reference to 
factors such as the age of the students [and] their particular vulnerability…’ 
 
 
In B(E) v Order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (British Columbia),58 decided a few years 
after the Bazley and Jacobi cases, the Canadian Supreme Court found that the educational 
 
 
 
_________________ 
52    2003 HCA 4. 
53    Gleeson J para 20. 
54    The four recognised relationships in which non-delegable duties are acknowledged by Australian law and 
      listed by the Court are the following: employer and employee, hospital and patient, adjoining owners of land and education   
      authority and student. 
55    McHugh J. 
56    Para 65. 
57    Para 74. 
58   2005 SCC 60. 
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authority was not vicariously liable for the sexual abuse of a pupil by an employee working in 
the bakery at the school. 
The Court held that the connection between the job-conferred authority and the sexual 
assault was not sufficiently close.59 The employee, although residing on the premises of the 
school where the pupils also lived, ‘had no position of power, trust or intimacy with respect to 
the children.’60 
The above discussion sketches the development of the close connection test for vicarious 
liability in some common law countries. The Canadian Supreme Court in the Bazley case 
relied on a close connection between the wrongful act of the employee and the risk of the 
undertaking. The House of Lords in the Lister case in turn appeared to favour a close 
connection between the wrongful act of the employee and acts authorised by the employer. 
The judgment of the Australian High Court in the Lepore case indicated that these two 
approaches are not far apart, as an investigation into whether the enterprise will increase the 
risk of an employee’s offending would include an investigation into the nature of the 
employee’s responsibilities. A need to focus on the exact duties of the employee to establish 
whether there is a close connection was also confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the Oblates case. 
The Constitutional Court’s formulation of the close connection test in the NK case will be 
analysed against the background of the preceding discussion of its development in common 
law countries. 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
59 Para 57. 
60 Para 51. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  21 
 
Vicarious liability is a form of strict, secondary liability that arises under the common law 
doctrine of agency respondeat superior which means the responsibility of the superior for the 
acts of their subordinate or the responsibility of any third party that had the ‘right, ability or 
duty to control’ the activities of a violator. It can be distinguished from contributory liability, 
another form of secondary liability which is rooted in the tort of enterprise liability 
Under English Law principles are vicariously liable, under the respondeat superior doctrine, 
for negligent acts or omissions by their employees in the course of employment (sometimes 
referred to as 'scope of employment').[1] For an act to be considered within the course of 
employment, it must either be authorized or be so connected with an authorized act that it 
can be considered a mode, though an improper mode, of performing it. 
 
Courts sometimes distinguish between an employee's "detour" vs. "frolic". For instance, an 
employer will be held liable if it is shown that the employee had gone on a mere detour in 
carrying out their duties, whereas an employee acting in his or her own right rather than on 
the employer's business is undertaking a "frolic" and will not subject the employer to liability. 
Generally, an employer will not be held liable for assault or battery committed by employees, 
unless the use of force was part of their employment (such as a police officers), or they were 
in a field likely to create friction with persons they encountered (such as car re-possessors). 
However, the employer of an independent contractor is not held vicariously liable for the 
tortuous acts of the contractor, unless the contractor injures someone to whom the employer 
owes a non-delegable duty of care, as when the employer is a school authority and the 
injured party a pupil. 
Employers are also liable under the common law principle represented in the Latin phrase, 
"qui facit per alium facit per se" (one who acts through another acts in one's own interests). 
That is a parallel concept to vicarious liability and strict liability, in which one person is held 
liable in criminal law or tort for the acts or omissions of another. 
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In English law, a corporation can only act through its employees and agents so it is 
necessary to decide in which circumstances the law of agency or vicarious liability will apply 
to hold the corporation liable in tort for the frauds of its directors or senior officers. 
If liability for the particular tort requires a state of mind, then to be liable, the director or senior 
officer must have the state of mind and it must be attributed to the company. For example 
should employees of a company, whilst acting within the scope of their authority but unknown 
to the directors, used company funds to acquire shares, the question arise as to whether the 
company knew, or ought to have known that it had acquired those shares. Whether by virtue 
of their actual or ostensible authority as agents acting within their authority or as employees 
acting in the course of their employment, their acts and omissions and their knowledge could 
be attributed to the company, and this could give rise to liability as joint tortfeasors where the 
directors have assumed responsibility on their own behalf and not just on behalf of the 
company. 
So if a director or officer is expressly authorised to make representations of a particular class 
on behalf of the company, and fraudulently makes a representation of that class to a Third 
Party causing loss, the company will be liable even though the particular representation was 
an improper way of doing what he was authorised to do. The extent of authority is a question 
of fact and is significantly more than the fact of an employment which gave the employee the 
opportunity to carry out the fraud. 
From the above it is clear that the doctrine of vicarious liability and its impact in common law 
countries had to be researched and interpreted first in terms of its incorporation and 
interpretation in terms of our law. 
The standard test for vicarious liability is the question whether the employee was ‘engaged in 
the affairs or business of his employer’ which is sometimes expressed as whether the 
employee was acting ‘in the course and scope’ of his or her employment, at the time the 
delict was committed. At one extreme the delict might be committed by the employee while 
going about his or her employment in the ordinary way, in which case the employer will be 
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liable. At the other extreme the delict might be committed by a person who, albeit that he or 
she is an employee, is going about his or her own private business, unconnected to that of 
the employer, in which case the employer is not liable. Between these extremes is an 
uncertain and wavering line. Decided cases fall somewhere between these two extremes.  
 
It is important to refer to and compare cases in Canada and England as same reflect a 
principal shift by introducing into the enquiry duties on the part of the employer. These cases 
all concern intentional acts of employees. It was decided that trial judges are required to 
investigate the employee’s specific duties and determine whether they gave rise to special 
opportunities of wrongdoing. In cases such as child abuse, special attention should be paid 
to the existence of a power or dependency relationship, which on its own often creates a 
considerable risk of wrongdoing. To justify imposing liability on the basis of a creation of risk 
it was decided that there must be a strong connection between the created risk and the 
wrongful act. If such connection is absent the employer will not be held vicariously liable. 
If this approach to the nature of employment is adopted, it is not necessary to ask the 
question whether the wrongful acts were modes of doing authorized acts. It becomes 
possible to consider the question of vicarious liability on the basis that the employer 
undertook to abide by certain conditions through the services of an employee and that there 
is a very close connection between the torts of the employee and his employment. Once this 
is established, the employer can be held vicariously liable.  
 
The introduction into the principle of vicarious liability of a duty owed by the employer was 
taken further by adopting the ‘two-stage’ enquiry that was adopted in later cases. The first 
stage requires a subjective consideration of the employee’s state of mind and is a purely 
factual stage. Should the state of mind be one of entire self-direction, then the second 
objective stage of whether even though the acts done have been done solely for the 
purposes of the employee, there is nevertheless a sufficiently close link between the 
employee’s acts for his own interests and the purposes of the employer. These stages do not 
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raise purely factual questions, but mixed questions of fact and law. The question of law it 
raises relate to what is ‘sufficiently close’ to give rise to vicarious liability. It is in answering 
this question that a court should consider the need to give effect to the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights. 
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CHAPTER 2.5 
 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE CLOSE CONNECTION TEST FORMULATED IN 
NK V MINSTER OF SAFETY AND SECURITY 
 
The Constitutional Court is clearly correct in maintaining that no part of the common law 
should be immune to the pervasive normative influence of the Constitution. In cases such as 
Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele61 and Minister of Safety and Security v Van 
Duivenboden62 the Bill of Rights has already had an effect on the way courts assessed the 
wrongfulness of acts of the police. The Constitutional Court rightly states that there is no 
reason why questions of constitutional rights cannot arise in a different aspect of the law of 
delict, namely vicarious liability. 
The court in the NK case distinguished it from Phoebus Apollo Aviation CC v Minister of 
Safety and Security63 (hereafter Phoebus Apollo).  In Phoebus Apollo, which dealt with 
policemen who stole money, the Constitutional Court held that the case did not raise a 
constitutional matter. But in the appeal to the Constitutional Court in the NK case, 
constitutional issues were placed in sharp focus. O’Regan J distinguished the Phoebus 
Apollo case on the ground that the constitutionality of the rules of vicarious liability was not in 
issue in that case. This result is criticised by Carole Lewis64 who argues that there is in 
principle no difference between a policeman who commits the crime of theft and a policeman 
who commits the crime of rape.  
However, these two cases could perhaps be distinguished on the basis that the policemen in 
the Phoebus Apollo case were not on duty, not wearing uniforms and were not investigating 
the original robbery. It could be argued that the connection between their employment and 
their acts was not sufficiently close to justify the vicarious liability of the employer. One of the 
difficulties with having a Constitutional Court as the highest authority in regard to cases 
_____________ 
61  In Carmichele v Minster of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 54 the Constitutional Court stated that the      
     Constitution is not merely a formal document regulating public power, but it embodies an objective normative value  
     system that provides the matrix within which the common law must be developed. 
62   2002 6 SA 431 (SCA). 
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63   2003 2 SA 34 (CC). 
64   ‘Reaching the Pinnacle: Principles, Policies and People for a Single Apex Court in South Africa’ 2005 SAJHR 509. 
involving constitutional matters and a Supreme Court of Appeal which is the highest authority 
in all other cases, is that parties have to cast an appeal to the Constitutional Court in 
constitutional terms.65 When the matter in the NK case reached the Constitutional Court, it 
was argued that the State bears direct responsibility if they are in breach of their 
constitutional obligation to protect the complainant. It would seem as if the court in the NK 
case could only have reached its decision by casting the reasons for holding the employer 
liable in constitutional terms. To justify hearing the case, the Constitutional Court had to find 
the reasons why the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the K case was repugnant 
to the Constitution. The Constitutional Court could instead have relied on the development of 
the doctrine of vicarious liability in South Africa and other common law countries, and could 
have held the employer liable without having recourse to a complicated objective part of the 
close connection test involving constitutional values. 
The question is what guidance can be derived from the test formulated by the Constitutional 
Court in the NK case,66 particularly in cases where constitutional rights and duties (especially 
of non-state parties) are less directly relevant. This question is important as the 
Constitutional Court intended to formulate a general test applicable to all vicarious liability 
cases. 
In applying the test it formulated, the Constitutional Court found that a close connection did 
exist between the acts of the policemen and their employment because of the following three 
factors:  
• the Minister, and therefore the policemen-employees, had a statutory and 
constitutional duty to protect the victim;  
 
____________ 
65 Lewis 2005 SAJHR 519-522 . 
66 Supra para 33. 
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• the policemen had a special duty to protect her as they escorted her home – she 
trusted them because they wore uniforms; and 
•  they breached their duty by way of a commission (the rape) and an omission (failing 
to protect her in accordance with their duty).  
According to the Constitutional Court, the above three factors, viewed against the 
background of the Constitution, provided a sufficiently close connection for the employer to 
be held liable; unlike the Supreme Court of Appeal, it therefore felt that the failure to impose 
such liability would give rise to a result at odds with the Constitution. Earlier in the judgment, 
the Constitutional Court explained the implication of the development of the test for vicarious 
liability by stating that the principles of vicarious liability and their application need to be 
developed to accord more fully with the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution.  
The Court warned that this conclusion should not be misunderstood to mean anything more 
than that the existing principles of common law vicarious liability must be understood and 
applied within the normative framework of our Constitution, and the social and economic 
purposes which they seek to pursue. The Court further emphasised that the conclusion also 
does not mean that an employer will be saddled with damages simply because injuries might 
be horrendous. Courts should bear in mind the values the Constitution seeks to promote and 
should on that basis decide whether the case before it is of the kind which in principle should 
render the employer liable.67 
The Constitutional Court developed the test for vicarious liability to encompass constitutional 
values and applied this test to the specific case in which constitutional duties were breached 
and constitutional rights infringed. No guidance was given as to the kind of case that will in 
principle dictate that the employer should be held liable if no constitutional duties were 
breached or no constitutional rights were infringed. From recent decisions in cases not  
 
________________ 
67 NK case para 23. 
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dealing with vicarious liability but other aspects of State liability, it could be concluded that 
constitutional norms may result in the State being held liable in circumstances where private 
persons would not be held liable: 
‘It is clear that the Constitution will have a strong influence where the defendant is a state party and while it 
is undesirable to create a separate body of rules for state parties, the application of standard principles 
could well lead to results different from those cases in which ordinary persons are involved.’68 
 
 
The above would be especially true where the State is in breach of a constitutional duty. The 
question is whether there will be an absolute or non-delegable duty on the State if its 
constitutional duty is breached by one of its employees. Another question left unanswered is 
under which circumstances constitutional values underlying the close connection test, as 
formulated by the Constitutional Court, would require that a non-state employer should be 
held vicariously liable. The Constitutional Court in the NK case held that the doctrine of 
vicarious liability must be applied within the normative framework of the Constitution, but that 
the infringement of the rights of the third party alone (‘horrendous injuries’) would not be 
sufficient to bring about the close connection needed for vicarious liability. Something else is 
needed. In applying the test to the facts of the case, the Court emphasised the duty of the 
employer and employees, the trust placed in them by the victim because of their authority 
and the abuse of that authority. These factors, which correspond with the development of the 
doctrine in common law countries, may provide guidance to apply the close connection test 
as developed by the Constitutional Court to cases where the State is not the employer and 
where constitutional norms are not directly relevant. 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
68    See Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict 3 ed (2005) 25 
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                                                               CHAPTER 3 
 
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S TEST TO ‘NON 
CONSTITUTIONAL’ CASES 
 
3.1 The Constitutional Court 
It is clear that the Constitutional Court purported to lay down a general test for all vicarious 
liability cases and not only those where constitutional issues are prominent.69 
The test seems to be specially formulated for the NK case, or at least for cases where the 
State had a duty to guard constitutional rights and these rights have been infringed by the 
very employees charged with guarding these rights. It is thus a very narrow test. 
However, the Constitutional Court stated that the test is broad enough to include not only 
constitutional norms, but other norms as well. The problem with this test is that from now on 
a court will have to interpret and apply relevant norms in every case of vicarious liability to 
establish whether there will be a close connection. The question then is which norms could 
be distilled from the NK judgment that would indicate a close connection and thus make it fair 
to hold the employer liable? These ‘other norms’ may be understood to mean that the legal 
convictions of the community (infused by constitutional values) should in each case be taken 
into account. While it is laudable that the Court did away with a test that is purely factual and 
acknowledged that it is in the end a policy decision of whether the employer should be held 
liable, the guidance given on how to decide the matter is confusing. The test formulated by 
the Constitutional Court could lead to uncertainty about how to apply it and this may lead to 
undesirable results. 
 
3.2 The close connection test in relation to the Constitution 
The close connection test, ‘viewed through the prism of the Constitution’,70 could mean that 
the State would always be liable if it has a constitutional duty as constitutional values would 
be better protected if compensation comes from the ‘deeper pocket’ of the employer. The test  
________________________________ 
69 NK case para 45 
70 NK as above v Minister of Safey and Security supra para 22 . 
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has the potential to lead to liability for the State every time its duty is breached by its 
employees, thus a kind of non-delegable duty.71 The test may also be interpreted to mean 
that as soon as constitutional rights are infringed, the employer should be held liable as 
these rights are of the utmost importance to society72 and that holding the employer liable 
would protect these rights better than by only holding the employee liable. This raises three 
important questions. First, how is the countervailing principle,73 namely that the employer 
must not be held liable in all circumstances, to be applied where the State owes a 
constitutional duty? Secondly, how can the liability of a non-state employer (who owes no 
constitutional duty) be limited where constitutional rights are infringed? And thirdly, how is the 
close connection test (of viewing the applicability of vicarious liability through the 
constitutional prism) to be applied to cases where constitutional duties or rights are not 
prominent? 
 
3.3 Factors that would indicate a close connection 
The Constitutional Court emphasised the constitutional duty of the employer and the 
corresponding duties of the employees in the NK case.74 The fact that the employer had a 
duty towards the third person and had placed an employee in a position of authority to do the 
duty on its behalf, indicated by the wearing of uniforms, was an important factor in leading 
the Court to the conclusion that there was in fact a close connection. In Lister v Hesley Hall, 
the duty of the employer to the pupils as well as the duty of the warden (bathing the children, 
putting them to bed and other intimate actions associated with parenting), as well as the 
abuse of the position of power and trust in which the employee was placed, indicated a close 
connection between the wrongful acts and the employment.75 The opportunity of abuse was 
therefore created by the employer and forged a close connection between the wrongful act 
and employment. On this test, sexual abuse by the porter or groundsman at the school    
    _______________ 
71 See the requirements for such a duty in the discussion of the Lepore case supra. 
72 See the discussion of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) in para 15 of the NK case. 
73 NK case para 20. 
74 Supra para 51. 
75 NK case para 50. 
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would, according to Lord Millet,76 not render the employer vicariously liable. 
In Bazley v Curry the duties and authority of the employee and the opportunity of abuse  
were also scrutinised to evaluate the risk that the wrongful act could take place. The 
vulnerability of the victims was emphasised in both the Bazley and Lister cases. The duty to 
protect a weaker party (vulnerability of the victim) also seems to be one of the factors taken 
into consideration by the Constitutional Court77 in finding a close connection.  
However, if the vulnerability of the victim does not enhance or contribute to the risk inherent 
to the undertaking, deterrence would have no effect. Holding the employer vicariously liable 
would not serve policy considerations and would thus not be fair. The vulnerability of the 
victims in both the Bazley and Lister cases was part of the inherent risk posed by the 
undertaking as these were the children for whom the warden had to care and they were 
under his authority. The vulnerability of a specific victim should not always be seen as 
enhancing the risk or probability that wrongful actions would take place. 
In Jacobi v Griffiths the victims were also a boy and girl of tender age, but they were not 
under the authority of the youth club organiser in the same way as the children in the Bazley 
and Lister cases. Their vulnerability did not contribute to the risk posed by the undertaking.78 
The same argument would be true in the Canadian decision of B(E) v Order of the Oblates79 
in which the baker/boatsman did not have any authority in respect of the pupils. The 
sufficiently close link (close connection) between risk and the wrongful acts of the employee 
as applied in the Bazley case provides a satisfactory test for the employer’s liability, as the 
risk-theory also encompasses the policy considerations of adequate compensation and 
deterrence. The argument is that it is fair that the employer who places the risk in the  
 
_____________ 
76 Para 82. 
77 The Constitutional Court in the NK case para 18 quoted part of the decision of the court in  
    the Carmichele case that emphasised the duties of the police to protect the constitutional  
    rights of women and children. 
78 Lister v Hesley Hall para 86. 
79 Supra. 
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community for his own benefit must compensate the victim and this will lead to the employer 
taking care that such acts will not take place (in other words, it acts as a deterrence). A list of 
circumstances that will point towards enhancement of risk such as the opportunity to abuse 
power, vulnerability of the victim and the opportunity for friction is provided in that case as 
indicated above.80 If the factors listed in the Bazley case were to be applied in the NK case, it 
would point towards a significant enhancement of the risk that abuse of power would take 
place. The position of authority indicated by the wearing of uniforms, the use of a police 
vehicle and carrying of fire-arms by the policemen indicate an enhancement of the risk that 
policemen could commit the crime of rape. The vulnerability of potential victims (especially 
the trust that would be placed in the policemen by vulnerable victims needing protection) 
could indicate a close connection between the risk of the undertaking (police force) and the 
acts that caused the harm.81 However, the vulnerability of the victim in the NK case could be 
seen as incidental and not as an inherent factor enhancing the risk of the undertaking. In this 
regard the Constitutional Court stated that: 
‘... the opportunity to commit the crime would not have arisen but for the trust the applicant placed in them 
because they were policemen, a trust which harmonizes with the constitutional mandate of the police and 
the need to ensure that mandate is successfully fulfilled’.82 
 
 
This aspect is emphasised as the argument seems to be that if the Minister is not held liable 
in this case, the public would no longer place their trust in the police. The test applied by the 
Lister case as well as by the NK case, which focuses on the duty of the employer entrusted 
to the employee, emphasises the authority with which the employee was endowed and the 
opportunity created by that authority to abuse the position. In these circumstances it would 
seem fair to hold the employer liable as the wrongful act could not have been committed but 
 
 
_______________ 
80 NK case para 41. 
81 NK v Minister of Safety para 57. 
82 NK v Minister of Safety and Security para 57. 
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for the authority and position of power with which the employer endowed the employee. In 
the absence of authority of the employee, the connection between the act and the 
employment would not be sufficiently close and the employer would accordingly not be 
vicariously liable. This will be the case whether the duty is constitutional or not, but as 
indicated above, there could be a stronger tendency to hold the State liable if it owes a 
constitutional duty to the victim. The test formulated in the NK case could be seen to signify 
that a duty (not necessarily of a constitutional nature) resting on the employer and 
‘delegated’ to the employee, would be an important factor in bringing about a close 
connection. This would especially be true in circumstances in which the employer placed 
such a person in a position of power or trust that has created the opportunity to abuse by the 
employee. The normative values of society (or the legal convictions of the community) could 
be seen to prescribe that the employer should be held liable if the wrongful act is closely 
linked to the employment or risk of the undertaking. 
The factors below would indicate a close connection in terms of the test laid down in the NK 
case:  
• if the State is the employer and owed a constitutional duty to the victim;  
• breach of the victim’s constitutional rights by the employee; 
• if the employee was placed in a position of authority and as a result of this, trusted by 
the victim; 
• in the case of the police, providing the employee with a police vehicle, a uniform, 
handcuffs, firearm, et cetera, enhances the opportunity (the risk) of the employee 
committing a wrongful   act; and  
• if vulnerable groups, such as women and children, suffer damages. 
Two of these factors might be contentious, namely the stricter liability of the State and the 
vulnerability of the victim as indicated above.  
On the close connection test as applied in the cases above, the Minster would not be liable if 
a woman walking in the garden of the police station was raped by the gardener, also an 
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employee of the Minister. There would be no close connection as the gardener would have 
no duty to the woman. The Minister of Police does have a duty to protect the woman, but this 
duty was not assigned to the gardener. In a second scenario, an off-duty plain clothes 
policeman without a fire-arm or official vehicle would pose less of a risk that trust will be 
placed in him and that the trust could be abused. But in the third scenario of a policeman 
who works at the child protection unit and then abuses the children he has to take care of, 
the Minister will be liable. The vulnerability of the victims will be part of the reason why there 
is a close connection. In the first two scenarios, the policy consideration of deterrence would 
not be served if the Minster is held liable, while it would be served if the Minster is held liable 
in the third scenario. 
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                                                    CHAPTER 4 
 
SOUTH AFRICAN CASES DECIDED SINCE THE DECISION IN NK V MINISTER OF 
SAFETY AND SECURITY 
 
4.1 INJURY CAUSED BY A POLICEMAN 
Luiters v Minister of Safety and Security83 involved an off-duty policeman who placed himself 
on duty. In endeavouring to arrest certain suspects who had robbed him, he shot and 
severely injured Luiters, an innocent passer-by. Apparently the policeman was under the 
impression that Luiters was one of the robbers. The Supreme Court of Appeal applied the 
two-stage test formulated in the NK case and found that the Minister was vicariously liable as 
the policeman placed himself on duty in endeavouring to arrest the robbers and thus 
subjectively acted in furtherance of his employer’s business. The implication was that there 
was no need to apply the objective second stage of the test, namely the close connection 
test. The Minister argued that in the case of an off-duty policeman, the subjective part of the 
test (factual test of determining whether the employee intended acting in the interests of the 
employer) should not be regarded as sufficient, and that in such a case a close connection 
should also be required between the state of mind of the employee and the employment.  
According to the Minister, this raised a constitutional issue, as the common law would have 
to be developed to extend the test formulated in the NK case. The Constitutional Court did 
not accept this argument. It held that off-duty policemen were already included in the test in 
the NK case, and that the two-stage test originated in the Rabie case, which did concern an 
off-duty policeman.84 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
83 2007 3 BCLR 287 (CC). 
84 Para 36 
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4.2 FRAUD 
In Minister of Finance v Gore (hereafter the ‘Gore’ case),85 the Supreme Court of Appeal had 
to decide whether the Minister could be vicariously liable for the deliberate dishonest actions 
of its employees. The Court applied the close connection test and found that objectively there 
was indeed a close connection between the employees’ actions and that which they were 
employed to do. Although they acted fraudulently in awarding the tender, they did in fact go 
through the process of awarding it. This application of the test stops short of examining 
whether there was a legal close connection. The Court remarked that as a result of the 
difficulties raised by these cases it is important to point out the policy reasons for imposing 
liability in each case. The fact that the Court referred to the policy reasons of deterrence and 
adequate compensation advanced by McLachlin J in Bazley v Curry, is confirmed by the 
case being mentioned in a footnote to the previous statement.86 The Court did not rely on 
constitutional or any other norms to reach its conclusion of whether there was a close 
connection. The Court stated that even in the case of a deliberately dishonest act, committed 
for the employee’s own interests, the employer may be rendered liable:  
‘if, objectively seen, there is a sufficiently close link between the self-directed conduct and the employer’s 
business’.87 
 
The court further stated that: 
‘However gross the violation of their duties by Louw and Scholtz, it cannot be gainsaid that all their actions 
that were directed at wrongfully securing the contract for Nisec were nonetheless performed so that the 
tender would be awarded… the award for the tender was false but not a total fake.’88 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
85  2007 1 SA 111 (SCA). 
86 Minister of Finance v Gore supra n 10. 
87 Supra para 28. 
88  Supra para 30 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  37 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in this case referred to the Constitutional Court decision in the 
NK case in a footnote to indicate that vicarious liability for intentional wrongdoing is by no 
means rare.89 The Court did not mention the development of the test by the court in the NK 
case. 
The factual closeness of their wrongful acts to their employment forged the required close 
connection. The guidance which the Constitutional Court provided by its close connection 
test in two parts was not followed.90 
No constitutional rights or duties were raised in the case. The Court emphasised the duties 
of the employees and the fact that their employer placed them in a position of authority which 
gave them the opportunity to act fraudulently. Some of the factors indicated in the NK  
case were, however, found to be present. The legal part of the objective test could thus be 
satisfied. The outcome of the case would probably have been the same had the test as laid 
down in the NK case been applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________ 
89 Supra para 27. 
90 The SCA instead was guided by cases such as Feldmann, Rabie and  
     Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit v Japmoco BK h/a Status Motors 2002 5 SA 649 (SCA). 
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4.3 RAPE  
The case of The Minister of Safety and Security v F (592/09) [2011] ZASCA 3 (22 February 
2011),91 (hereafter the ‘F case’), takes the case of NK a step further. The respondent 
(hereafter referred to as ‘Ms F’), was in a similar situation as the victim in the NK case and as 
such also raped by a policeman.  
The facts of the case were that Ms F visited a night club on 14 October 1998.92 After midnight 
Ms F was offered a lift home by Mr Van Wyk (a police officer on standby duty).93 There were 
two other passengers in the car.94 The court referred to Standing Order 6, issued by the 
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service in June 1997, and explains that 
‘standby duty’ means that Van Wyk could have been called upon to ‘attend any crime-related 
incident if the need arose’.95 Van Wyk at the time had the use of an unmarked vehicle if he 
needed it for standby duty and he was being paid the prescribed hourly tariff. Ms F noticed 
that the vehicle was equipped with a police radio. 
Ms F was seated on the back seat of the vehicle with one of the other passengers when they 
left the club. After the two passengers had been dropped off, Van Wyk asked Ms F to move 
to the front passenger seat, which she did.96 Upon moving to the front seat, Ms F saw a pile 
of police dockets and she asked Van Wyk about the files. Van Wyk replied that he was a 
private detective. Ms F testified she understood that he was a policeman.97 Instead of driving 
her home as agreed, Van Wyk drove towards Kaaimansrivier and told Ms F that he wanted 
to see his friends before dropping her off. At that point Ms F became suspicious.98 When they 
approached Kaaimansrivier, Van Wyk stopped the vehicle at a dark spot. Ms F got out of the 
vehicle, ran away and hid. Van Wyk waited and then left after a while. Ms F came out of 
hiding, approached the road and hitchhiked. Van Wyk’s vehicle then stopped next to her and  
___________________ 
91 The Minister of Safety and Security v F (592/09) [2011] ZASCA 3 
92 Para 8. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Para 9. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Para 10. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Para 11. 
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again he offered to take her home. Ms F was desperate and agreed. She testified that she 
believed that Van Wyk was a policeman and she trusted him despite her suspicions.99  
On their way to Ms F’s home, Van Wyk unexpectedly turned off the road near Kraaibos. 
Again Ms F tried to flee but Van Wyk prevented her and then assaulted and raped her.100 He 
threatened to kill her if she told anybody.101 However, Ms F reported the crime and this 
resulted in Van Wyk’s conviction and subsequent sentence.102  
Upon reaching the age of majority in December 2005, Ms F instituted an action for damages 
against the Minister of Safety and Security and Van Wyk.103  
 
4.3.1  JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT 
Bozalek J applied the test that was laid down in K and found the Minister vicariously liable for 
the damages suffered by Ms F.104 The court ruled that there was a sufficiently strong link 
between Mr Van Wyk’s actions and his employer’s business to justify that conclusion. The 
Court highlighted three factors in support of its conclusion, namely Van Wyk’s being in 
possession of a police vehicle, Ms F’s understanding that Van Wyk was a policeman, and 
what the Court refers to as the nature of the assistance that Van Wyk pretended to offer as 
well as the normal task of members of the police service, which is ‘to protect vulnerable 
groups such as women and children.’105 Not surprisingly, the Minister raised the issue of Ms 
F’s victory potentially opening the floodgates to the state’s strict liability for delictual acts 
committed by the police. Bozalek J’s response was that the test in K was sufficiently flexible 
to allow a case-by-case determination of the issues.106  
Various prominent academics (such as Neethling107 and Scott108) commented on the  
___________________ 
99  Para 11 
100 Para 14. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Para 15. 
103 Para 16 
104 Para  22 F v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 606 (WCC). 
105 Para 18. 
106 Para 19c. 
107 Neethling ‘Vicarious Liability of the State for Rape by a Police Official’ 2011 TSAR 186. 
108 Scott “Middellike Aanspreeklikheid van die Staat vir Misdadige Polisie-optrede: Die Heilsame Ontwikkeling Duur Voort: F v    
     Minister of Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 606 (WKK)” 2011 TSAR 135 135-147. 
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judgment of the High Court. In his discussion of the High Court judgment, Neethling referred 
to K as well as Minister of Safety and Security v Luiters109 and commented that the 
‘authoritative and well-reasoned’110 decision of Bozalek J is correct.111 The state is in the 
same position as other employers and that the state may escape vicarious liability when it 
can show that the official was a regular employee of the state at the time when the delict was 
committed.’112 The latter will be the case when the state did not at the particular time have 
the right to control the employee. Control, according to Neethling, ‘does not mean factual 
control but the right of control.’113 Control is important only when it is ascertained that an 
employer-employee relationship existed but it is also a factor that must be taken into account 
when determining whether ‘a sufficiently close link existed between the conduct of the 
employee and his employment, and whether the employee acted within the scope of his 
employment.’114  
A distinction was to be drawn between on-duty and off-duty misconduct. If the conduct is 
regarded as off-duty and it is determined that it falls outside the course and scope of 
employment, the employer will not be held vicariously liable. When an employee’s conduct 
falls outside the course and scope of his or her employment the employer can hold an 
employee accountable for his or her conduct if it impacts on his or her business. Such 
conduct would impact on the employer’s business ‘if it prejudices a legitimate business 
interest or undermines the relationship of trust and confidence that is an essential component 
of the employment relationship’.115 Dismissal could only be justified if the misconduct, 
whether committed on or off-duty, has a serious impact on the employment realationship.116  
_____________________  
109  2007 2 SA 106 (CC).  
110  Neethling 2011 TSAR 186 189. 
111  See also Neethling “Liability of the State for Rape by a Policeman: The Saga Takes  
      a New Direction: Minister of Safety and  
      Security v F 2011 3 SA 487 (SCA)” 2011 Obiter 428 430. 
112  Neethling 2011 TSAR 186 190. 
113  Ibid. 
114  Ibid. 
115  Van Niekerk, Christianson, McGregor, Smit & Van Eck Law@work (2012) 269. 
116  Ibid. 
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With reference to misconduct and with specific reference to police officials, Neethling points 
out that: 
‘[t]he right of control is at the highest level when a policeman is officially on duty (as in the K case), or 
where an off-duty officer has put himself on duty (as in the Luiters case), but the level of control is also 
acceptable where direct control is attenuated or limited because the officer is on standby-duty (as in the F 
case). But this does not mean that vicarious liability cannot exist where a police official committed a delict 
whilst off duty. Although the element of control is absent at that particular time, Bozalek J (618C-G) pointed 
out that the Rabie case (133-134) serves as authority for the proposition that the state does not 
necessarily escape vicarious liability for a police officer’s delicts simply because he is formally off duty, 
dressed in private clothes and commits the delict purely for his private and selfish purposes. This will be 
the case where an off-duty policeman, without putting himself on duty, nevertheless mala fide purported to 
act as policeman in committing the delict in question.’117  
 
 
Bozalek J referred to the ‘creation of risk of harm’ as formulated in Rabie.118 Neethling and 
Scott discusses this issue in detail. Scott,119 explains that the court attaches much value to 
the risk principle in light of the fact that Bozalek J was willing to hold the state liable, even 
though the employee had no previous convictions. Neethling is correct that the creation of 
risk-approach should be considered in all instances of intentional wrongdoing by an 
employee and that: 
‘[a]s a general guideline an employer should be liable for an (intentional) delict by his employee 
if his appointment and work conditions enabled him to commit the delict (and hence created a heightened 
risk of prejudice) in such a manner.’120  
 
 
 
 
___________________ 
117  Neethling 2011 TSAR 189. Scott’s (2011 TSAR 145) sentiments are similar to the extent where he concludes as follows:  
      ‘Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat hierdie uitspraak onafwendbaar was in die lig van die presedent wat in die  
       baanbrekende beslissing van regter O’Regan in die K-saak neergelê is. Die enigste werklike verskil tussen die  
       onderhawige feitestel en die feite in daardie saak, is dat die polisiebeampte in hierdie geval, anders as in dié van K, nie  
       voltyds aan diens was nie. Daar kan volle instemming betuig word met die feit dat hierdie verskil nie voldoende rede was  
       om die onderhawige geval van die K-saak te onderskei en slegs om daardie rede ’n teenoorgestelde beslissing te vel nie.  
       Die motivering wat regter Bozalek verskaf vir sy hantering van die effek van die feit dat die tweede verweerder ten tyde van  
       delikspleging op blote bystandsdiens was, is myns insiens ten volle geregverdig en lofwaardig. Die gevolg van al die  
       statutêre bepalings en dicta uit die regspraak wat die regter aanhaal ter stawing van sy interpretasie van die gevolg van  
       bystandsdiens word trouens treffend geparafraseer in ’n enkele sinnetjie uit Rabie v Minister of Police 1984 1 SA 786 (W),  
       waarin die standaardtoets finaal sy beslag gekry het: ‘When a member of the South African Police Force is off duty it  
       cannot be suggested that his statutory duties as a member of the Force or that his authority are suspended’ (791F).’ 
118   625B-626C. 
119   2011 TSAR 135 143-144 (authors’ emphasis). 
120   Neethling 2011 TSAR 186 191. 
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This higher risk of prejudice would be present where employees (such as police officials) 
have been placed in a position of trust or authority and the possibility of abuse as well as the 
fact that the employee was on duty (or stand-by duty, as in the F case) when the delict was 
committed, should be indicative of liability and should be of increasing weight the more while 
committing a delict on duty. 
It seems that employers are always at risk which seems harsh and unfair. However, if the 
employer is held to be vicariously liable, the employer can discipline or dismiss an employee 
for misconduct. Fairness dictates that the employer must follow a fair procedure. The 
situation will be no different if the employer decides not to dismiss the employee for his 
misconduct. Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd121 is referred to as an illustration of 
such a situation. The Constitutional Court lists the following factors that must be taken into 
account when a commissioner is called upon to determine whether a misconduct dismissal 
was fair:  
(i) all the surrounding circumstances;  
(ii) the seriousness and importance of the rule that has been breached by the employee;  
(iii) the employer’s reason for imposing the sanction of dismissal;  
(iv) the employee’s reason for challenging the sanction of dismissal;  
(v) the harm caused by the employee’s conduct;  
(vi) considerations of other corrective measures;  
(vii) the impact the dismissal will have on the employee; and  
(viii) the employee’s service record.122  
 
__________________ 
121  2007 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) par 78. See also Lipka v Voltex PE 2010 31 ILJ 2199 (CCMA) in this regard. 
122  The Code of Good Practice: Dismissal sets out the requirements of a fair pre-dismissal procedure in cases of alleged  
      misconduct. This procedure is laid out in item 4(1) as follows: ‘Normally, the employer should conduct an investigation to  
      determine whether there are grounds for dismissal. This does not need to be a formal inquiry. The employer should notify  
      the employee of the allegations using a form and language that the employee can reasonably understand. The employee  
      should be allowed the opportunity to state a case in response to the allegations. The employee should be entitled to a  
      reasonable time to prepare a response and to the assistance of a trade union representative or fellow employee. After the  
      inquiry, the employer should communicate the decision taken, and preferably furnish the employee with a written  
      notification of that decision.’ 
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In addition to taking action short of dismissal (or dismissal) the employer can also exercise 
his or her right of recourse against the employee such as deductions from an employee’s 
remuneration. Such deductions will be subject to the employee agreeing in writing to the 
deduction and where the deduction is permitted in terms of a law, collective agreement, court 
order or arbitration award. When a deduction is made in terms of a written agreement it may 
only be made to reimburse an employer: 
a) for loss or damage only if the loss or damage occurred in the course of employment and 
was due to the fault of the employee;  
b) the employer has followed a fair procedure and has given the employee a reasonable 
opportunity to show why the deductions should not be made;  
c) the total amount of the debt does not exceed the actual amount of the loss or damage; 
and  
d) the total deductions from the employee’s remuneration in terms of this subsection do not 
exceed one-quarter of the employee’s remuneration in money.123  
With reference to the police services, Scott concludes as follows: 
‘Dit is duidelik dat daar ’n balans gevind sal moet word tussen die toenemende “wetteloosheid” van die 
sentrale polisiediens enersyds, en die groeiende blootstelling van die algemene publiek aan wetteloosheid 
en misdaad, andersyds. Inagneming van die konstitusionele imperatiewe wat betref veiligheid en sekuriteit, 
wat in talle meer onlangse wetgewende maatreëls en regspraak gestalte gevind het (soos deeglik uit die 
onderhawige saak blyk), noodsaak na my mening ’n uitspraak soos dié van regter Bozalek: mens kan as’t 
ware sê dat hoe hagliker die posisie van lede van die publiek as gevolg van die vergrype van lede van die 
polisiediens word, hoe swaarder word die konstitusionele plig van die staat om daardie tipe gewraakte 
optrede goed te maak. In ’n mate kom dit dus voor - en tereg - dat die staat wesentlik en vir praktiese 
doeleindes as ’n versekeraar optree vir die vergrype wat tot hierdie soort nadeel aanleiding gee. Hierdie 
toedrag van sake is egter aan die staat self te wyte, hoofsaaklik as gevolg van die versuim van die staat 
om ’n goedopgeleide, professionele polisiediens te ontwikkel en in stand te hou. Hy wat met sy bewuste 
aanstellingsbeleid bedenklike karakters in uniform steek, moet die gevolge dra wat deur sy optrede 
veroorsaak word. Indien daar dan “fouteer” moet word wat die verskynsel van middellike staatsaanspreek-
likheid vir polisiedelikte betref, is dit sonder twyfel te verkies dat dit in die rigting van ’n wyer 
staatsaanspreeklikheid sal geskied, as in die rigting van die blootstelling van lede van die algemene 
publiek aan ’n bestel waar die enigste remedie van die slagoffer teen ’n platsak individu is. Ter tempering 
behoort egter dan heroorweeg te word of die staat sonder meer regresloos behoort in te staan vir die 
regskostes aangegaan ter verdediging van sy werknemers in litigasie waar beslis word dat die 
werknemers flagrant onwettig of onregmatig opgetree het.’124  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________ 
123 S 34(1) & (2) BCEA.  
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Scott alleges that the principle ought to be that the legal costs must be claimed from the 
convicted criminal (the employee) and that vicarious liability should not exempt the primary 
perpetrator (the employee). The employer should be entitled to claim all legal costs from the 
employee.125 
  
4.3.2 SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL 
The Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the High Court. Nugent JA, with 
Snyders JA and Pilay AJA concurring, found that the state’s liability in K was based only on 
the delictual omission of the on-duty policeman involved.126 It was argued that an intentional 
delictual commission cannot attract the state’s vicarious liability. Thorough interpretation of K 
leads to the conclusion that the state is not vicariously liable for the positive delictual acts of 
police officials but only for their omissions.127 Because Van Wyk was not on duty, he was not 
engaged in the business of the police service and he had not breached his duty to protect Ms 
F. The court’s conclusion that an off-duty policeman has no duty to protect members of the 
public and cannot therefore be held liable for their failure to protect a victim of crime is of 
grave concern. Because there was no duty upon Van Wyk, he cannot be held personally 
liable.128 The majority also found that a policeman cannot be said to be ‘engaged in the 
affairs or business of his employer’ when he commits rape where rape is an ‘improper mode’ 
of exercising authority.129  
  
 
 
 
_____________ 
124  Scott 2011 TSAR 135 147.  
125  Ibid. 
126  Para 20. 
127  Ibid. 
128  Ibid.  
129  Para 22 
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The minority per Maya JA found that although the rape had nothing to do with the 
performance of Van Wyk’s official duties, there was a sufficiently close link ‘between his acts 
of personal gratification and the business of the police service’.130 The found that the fact that 
Van Wyk had offered to take Ms F home, placed him on duty. They also found that because 
Van Wyk was a policeman, Ms F was induced to trust Van Wyk and accept a lift from 
him.131 According to the minority the policy considerations underpin vicarious liability in 
matters such as these. It is also an employer’s duty to ensure that no one is injured as a 
result of an employee’s improper or negligent conduct when performing his duties.132 The 
minority found that K applies to these so-called deviation cases. This aspect was discussed 
in some detail by the Constitutional Court.133 
 
4.3.3   CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The substantive issue before the Constitutional Court was whether the state could be held 
vicariously liable for damages arising from the rape of a young girl by a policeman on stand-
by duty. 
It is often said that when two lawyers agree, at least one did not apply his mind. In this 
particular case, Mogoeng J and with him Cameron J, Kampepe J, Nkabinde J Skweyiya J 
and van der Westhuizen J found in favour of Ms F. Froneman J came to the same conclusion 
but delivered a separate judgment and Yacoob J found in favour of the Minister. These three 
judgments will be discussed separately.134 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
130  Para 23. 
131  Para 24. 
132  Ibid. 
133  The minority judgment of Maya JA, however, is not without criticism. Scott ‘Die Hoogste Hof van Appèl  
      smoor Heilsame Regsontwikkeling: Minister of Safety and Security v F 2011 3 SA 487 (HHA)” 2011 TSAR 773 786 argues  
      that although the minority judgment was less substantial than the majority judgment of Nugent AJ, the minority judgment is  
      preferred nevertheless. The reason Scott prefers it is because it followed the constitutional imperatives (as mentioned in K)  
      to protect vulnerable groups such as women and children. The majority judgment is also criticised by this author and he  
      concludes as follows: ‘[i]ndien die uitgebreide en meer beredeneerde meerderheidsuitspraak van appèlregter Nugent  
      nugter betrag word, tref dit die leser dat dit net sowel in die pre-konstitusionele era gelewer kon wees: daar is nie eens ’n  
      enkele beroep op die grondwetlike beginsels wat in die Carmichele- en K-sake gefigureer het nie. Bloot wat hierdie aspek  
      betref, is die hoogste hof van appèl se meerderheidsuitspraak ’n retrogressiewe stap in ’n andersins lofwaardige en  
      gesonde regsontwikkeling wat die grondwetlike regte van verkragte en aangerande vroue en kinders betref’. 
134   Para 40.  
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4.3.3 (1) Majority Judgment 
Mogoeng explains that vicarious liability ‘means:  
‘... that a person may be held liable for the wrongful act or omission of another even though the former did not, 
strictly speaking, engage in any wrongful conduct’.134 Employment is one such relationship and the employer is 
vicariously liable for the wrongful acts or omissions of an employee committed within the course and scope of 
employment ‘or whilst the employee was engaged in any activity reasonably identical to it.’135  
 
 
The Court found that there are two tests to determine whether there is vicarious liability. The 
first is the standard test which applies when an employee commits a delict while going about 
the employer’s business. The second test applies in the so-called deviation cases where the 
wrongdoing takes place outside the course and scope of employment.136 The court explains 
that this is an example of a deviation case and refers to the pre-constitutional case of 
Feldman as authority. In Feldman an employee used his employer’s vehicle to deliver 
parcels as instructed by his employer and afterwards attended to personal matters. He drank 
alcohol, drove back to his employer’s premises and negligently collided with and killed the 
father of two dependants. The majority held the employer liable for the minors’ loss of 
support.137 
Mogoeng J observes that Feldman proposes that employees are extensions of their 
employers and thus they create a risk of harm to others where their employees are inefficient 
or untrustworthy and herein lays the duty: those employers should ensure that their 
employees do not do the opposite of what they are supposed to do. In addition, where 
employees do the opposite of what they are supposed to do, a link must be established 
between the employers’ business and the delictual conduct complained of in order to hold 
the employer vicariously liable.138  
The Court refers to Rabie.139 In the Rabie case a mechanic who was employed by the police 
conducted a wrongful arrest, detention and assault of the plaintiff. At the time of the arrest,  
_______________ 
135   Para 41. 
136   Ibid. 
137   Para 42. The court quotes Watermeyer CJ in Feldman. See discussion in 2 above.  
138   Para 45. 
139   1986 1 SA 117 (A). 
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the perpetrator was not wearing a police uniform and he was off duty.140 Mogoeng J 
comments that Rabie is an example of an employee’s deviation from the tasks incidental to 
his employment and also comments that Rabie illustrates that even if a servant acts for his 
own purpose (which is a subjective enquiry relating to his intent), if there is a sufficiently 
close relationship between the servant’s acts and the ‘business of his master’, the latter may 
be liable. In determining the link, an objective test is used.141  
This argument was employed in both Rabie and K.142 The court formulates the crisp legal 
question in casu as ‘whether there was a close connection between the wrongful conduct of 
the policeman and the nature of their employment’. The court observes that Van Wyk did not 
rape Ms F in the furtherance of his duties or ‘the constitutional mandate of his 
employer.’143 The court found that van Wyk pursued his own selfish interests and if one uses 
the subjective test in Rabie and K, there cannot be state liability. However, the second leg of 
the test which pertains to the objective enquiry raises both factual questions and questions of 
law.144 The normative components that would determine the Minister’s liability are stated as 
the state’s constitutional obligations to protect the public, the fact that the public is entitled to 
place trust in the police, the significance of a policeman having been on standby duty or off 
duty, the policeman’s rape and simultaneous omission to protect the victim and whether 
there is an intimate link between the policeman’s conduct and his employment.145 The court 
deals with each of these aspects. 
    
  _________________ 
140   Para 46. 
141   Rabie 134C-E. 
142   The court quotes the following passage from K: ‘The approach makes it clear that there are two questions to be asked.  
       The first is whether the wrongful acts were done solely for the purposes of the employee. This question requires a  
       subjective consideration of the employee’s state of mind and is a purely factual question. Even if it is answered in the  
       affirmative, however, the employer may nevertheless be liable vicariously if the second question, an objective one, is  
       answered affirmatively. That question is whether, even though the acts done have been done solely for the purpose of the  
       employee, there is nevertheless a sufficiently close link between the employee’s acts for his own interests and the  
       purposes and the business of the employer. This question does not raise purely factual questions, but mixed questions of  
       fact and law. The questions of law it raises relate to ‘what is sufficiently close’ to give rise to vicarious liability. It is in  
       answering this question that a court should consider the need to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of  
       Rights.’ (Para 32). 
143   Para 51. 
144   Para 52. The court quotes O’Regan in K para 32. 
145   Para 52. 
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With regards the state’s constitutional obligations, the court finds that the state has a general 
duty to protect members of the public against violations of their constitutional rights.146 The 
court mentions that the state has obligations to prevent crime and to protect members of the 
public.147 The court finds that this aspect, together with Ms F’s constitutional rights, form the 
‘prism through which this enquiry should be conducted’.148 As far as Ms F’s constitutional 
rights are concerned, the court mentions her rights to freedom and security of the 
person149 and inherent dignity as the rights that should be protected and respected.150  
The court deals with sexual violence against women and children and confirms that the state 
should be at the forefront in the fight against these crimes and that there is a definite basis 
for holding the state liable for the wrongful conduct of a policeman, as well as one on stand-
by duty.151  
The second issue the court raises pertains to trust. This lays a definite basis for holding the 
state liable and it provides the required connection between the employment and the 
wrongful conduct.152 In the case of the police service, reliance is placed on each individual 
member to execute its constitutional mandate to the public.153 The court refers to K and 
makes the point that ‘the employment of someone as a police official may rightly be equated 
to an invitation extended by the police service to the public to repose their trust in that 
employee.’154 When that trust is abused there is a link between the employee’s employment 
and the misconduct complained of.155 It follows that where a child or a woman places trust in 
 
___________________ 
146   Para 53. 
147   Para 54. 
148   Ibid. 
149   Ibid. 
150   Ibid. 
151   Para 62. 
152  Ibid. 
153  Para 63. 
154  Ibid. K par 57. 
155  Para 64. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  49 
 
a policeman and that trust is violated, he or she would be personally liable to that woman or 
child and, in addition, if the policeman’s employment as a policeman secured the trust that 
was placed in him, the state might be held vicariously liable.156 It makes no difference 
whether the policeman was on standby duty or off-duty. The perception of the victim and the 
breach of trust are of importance here.157  
On the interplay between the commission and the omission, the Court provided a detailed 
judgment. The Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that the state can only be vicariously liable for 
an omission of an on-duty policeman who was under an obligation to protect a victim who 
was harmed in his presence and not for a positive act such as rape.158 However, this proves 
to be an incorrect interpretation of K because in the latter case the Court stressed that there 
was a simultaneous act (rape) and omission (failure to protect the victim) and both were 
equally important.159  
Mogoeng J also deals with the question relating to a sufficiently-close connection between 
the policeman’s delictual conduct and his employment. He states that normative factors are  
important here. Ms F placed her trust in Van Wyk and she was betrayed.160 Even though Van 
Wyk was on standby, the use of the police car facilitated the rape. In addition, he had the 
power to place himself on duty and the dockets in the car made Van Wyk identifiable as a 
policeman.161  
The majority concludes that the Minister is vicariously liable, even though the case is 
distinguishable from K because of the fact that the policemen were on duty and Van Wyk 
was not.162 
 
________________ 
156  Para 66. 
157  Para 68. 
158  Para 69. 
159   Para 71-73. 
160  Para 78.  
161  Para 80-81. 
162   Also refer to Neethling & Potgieter ‘Deliktuele staatsaanspreeklikheid weens polisieverkragting’ LitNet Akademies 9(1),  
       March 2012 (accessed at www.LitNet.co.za on 27-07-2012). 
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4.3.3 (2) Froneman J 
Froneman J holds the Minister liable but for different reasons than the majority judgment. 
The learned judge finds that the majority holds the state liable on the basis of vicarious 
liability and believes that the ‘close connection’ test as in K was correctly applied.163  
Froneman J states: 
‘We should recognise that state delictual liability in circumstances where the state has a general 
constitutional and statutory duty to protect people from crime is usually ‘direct’, and not ‘vicarious’ in the 
sense traditionally understood by that term. This is because the state invariably acts through the 
instruments of its organs - state officials performing public duties. The difficult normative issue of when the 
state is liable in delict for their conduct should in my view no longer be dealt with as an aspect of vicarious 
liability but rather as part of the normal direct enquiry into whether the elements of our law of delict are 
present when instruments of the state act.’164  
 
 
Froneman J identifies four reasons why it is important to move beyond vicarious liability. The 
first of these relates to the reason why the court in K found it important to use the ‘language 
of vicarious liability.’165 The second is to confirm the difficulties related to the language of 
vicarious liability where the state’s constitutional and statutory duties are concerned, the third 
is the state’s actions through its departments and employees and the fourth is the question 
whether wrongfulness as a delictual requirement is more suited to limit state liability than the 
‘sufficiently close link’ test.166  
The judge finds that the main judgment does not deal with direct liability because it was not 
argued. Froneman J considers the pleadings and the evidence an appropriate basis for 
considering the state’s direct liability. He finds that possible prejudice that may have been 
caused by using direct liability could have been addressed by calling for further argument or 
for referring the matter back to the high court but as that had not taken place, the judge 
proceeds to apply the ‘substantive normative considerations pioneered by K’. 
 
 
____________________ 
163   Para 88. 
 164  Para 89. 
165  Para 90. 
166  Ibid. 
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Froneman J begins by explaining that vicarious liability in its traditional formulation ‘may 
imply that there is no normative link between the conduct of an innocent employer ... and the 
culpable conduct of the employee’.167 However, there is a normative link between the 
employer-employee relationship and the delict and this link is the requirement that the delict 
must have been committed in the course and scope of the employee’s 
employment.168 According to the judge, this requirement gave rise to two ‘fallacies’, which 
was that scope of employment was a question of fact, and also that this rule had to be 
treated as separate from the reasons of justification for the rule.169 
According to Froneman J, K exposed both these false assertions. He states that vicarious 
liability has a normative character which relates not to the wrongfulness issue but to the 
‘sufficiently close connection’ investigation.170 In addition, K uses the language of vicarious 
liability as this was the basis upon which state delictual liability was always approached. The 
learned judge provides a short historical overview of vicarious state liability and then 
concludes that even though K applied the values of the Constitution, that judgment still uses 
traditional vicarious liability.171 He doubts whether it is at all appropriate and quotes 
Baxter172 who argues that where state officials act, they are not employees but rather the 
state or public authority itself. 
Froneman J refers to O’Regan J in K and concluded that the state was vicariously liable in 
delict for three reasons. The state and policeman had a general statutory and constitutional 
duty to prevent crime and protect members of the public. On the facts, the policeman had a 
specific duty to assist K and the harmful conduct of the policeman constituted a simultaneous 
commission and omission because the omission was their failure to protect K from harm.173  
The Supreme Court of Appeal in F deducted that only omissions by policemen provided a 
basis for delictual liability and where there was a positive act, there could not be vicarious 
__________________________ 
167  Para 93. 
168  Ibid. 
169  Para 94. 
170  Para 96. Froneman J refers to para 32, 45 and 49 of K.  
171  Para 98.  
172  Baxter Administrative law (1984) 63-632. 
173  Para 100. 
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liability. The Supreme Court of Appeal interpreted K to signify that where the policemen were 
personally liable for their omissions, the state was vicariously liable, but the state could also 
have been directly liable for its own omission.174 Froneman J finds that with the breach of 
public duties, it is about the legal duty not to cause harm negligently to another and this 
forms part of an enquiry into wrongfulness that is dealt with when taking into consideration 
the conduct of the employee.175 The distinction between vicarious liability and direct is not 
clear and for this reason, according to Froneman J, as well as because of ‘potential 
conceptual difficulty’, the question is whether the delictual liability of the state should be 
approached differently.176  
Froneman J deals with direct liability of the state.177 The Honourable Judge begins by stating 
that the state is a legal person in South African law.178 Organs of the state are only permitted 
to perform the functions entrusted to them by the Constitution.179 This includes the police 
service and ‘the acts of state organs are at the same time acts for which the state is liable, 
because they are the state’s own acts’.180 This will indicate that the State in the K case will be 
directly liable and not vicariously liable. According to Froneman J, direct liability had been 
dismissed in Mhlongo and Another NO v Minister of Police,181 but that was before the 1996 
Constitution.182  
 
 
_______________ 
 
174  Para 101. 
175  Para 104. 
176   Para 108.  
177   Although Neethling 2011 Obiter 428 437-438 also in the latter part of 2011 commented on the Supreme Court of Appeal’s  
       judgment in F, his concerns regarding direct liability are noteworthy. He feels that the state can only be vicariously, and not  
       directly, liable for delicts of employees because ‘[o]n the face of it, there does not seem to be any room for direct liability of  
       the state where the sate itself committed a wrong or delict acting through employees. Seen in this light, Nugent JA’s  
       submission that the SCA decisions in Van Duivenboden, Van Eeden, Hamilton and Carmichele (in 2004), none of which  
       was even based on intentional police wrongdoing, should have been founded upon direct liability of the state acting  
       through the instrument of its employees, cannot be accepted. In this regard Nugent JA made no attempt to explain how the  
       conduct of employees acting as functionaries of the state for the purposes of its direct liability, differs from their conduct  
       acting in the course and scope of their employment for the purposes of the state’s vicarious liability. This can only lead to  
       confusion and create legal uncertainty in an area where clarity existed beforehand. Clearly, in all these cases it was the  
       employees who, while acting in the execution of their legislative duties, negligently breached their duty to prevent crime  
       and protect the public. For their wrongs or delicts the state was correctly held vicariously liable.’ 
178   Para 109. 
179   Ibid. 
180   Ibid. 
181   1978 2 SA 551 (A). 
182   Para 110. 
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Wrongfulness is discussed. Froneman J finds that the requirement for wrongfulness as well 
as the ‘sufficiently close connection’ test involves questions of fact and law. It does matter 
whether the court makes this finding in respect of wrongfulness or as part of the ‘close 
connection’ test. It is clear that where a state employee breaches a public duty there is direct 
liability. Constitutional values must be taken into account in establishing 
wrongfulness.183 One of these constitutional values is accountability and that was evident in 
cases such as Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (herafter ‘Van 
Duivenboden’),184 and Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies Intervening).185  
Froneman J remarks on wrongfulness and states that this element:  
‘...  is determined on the assumption of negligent state conduct on the part of the official directly involved in 
the breach of a public duty...’  
 
and that  
 
‘[w]hen one turns to the actual determination of negligence this assumption obviously falls away’.186  
 
Froneman J asks whether Van Wyk and the Minister owed Ms F a public, legal duty and 
what the nature and content of such a duty might be.187 In dealing with this issue, the judge 
remarks that Van Wyk’s conduct constituted a commission because of the rape and a 
simultaneous omission because of a failure to protect her.188 In Froneman J’s opinion, the 
facts do point to the existence of a legal duty which was intentionally disregarded by Van 
Wyk. The judge states: 
‘Similar considerations apply here. I accept that there is no general obligation on the police to protect 
citizens from crime where they are not on duty. But the converse, that they never have that obligation 
when not on duty, is not true either. While off-duty, they are entitled to arrest without a warrant. They may 
place themselves on duty when the occasion warrants it. When they are placed in possession of police 
resources by virtue of their status as police officials when they are off-duty, particular circumstances might 
oblige them to assume their protective duties towards the public. Those circumstances would arise where, 
objectively, vulnerable people place their trust in them because they are police officials.’189  
 
In Froneman J’s opinion, wrongfulness had been established. 
____________ 
183   Para 121. 
184  2002 6 SA 431 (SCA).  
185  2001 4 SA 938 (CC). See also Neethling & Potgieter (n 124). The authors do not seem to prefer vicarious liability to direct  
      liability or vice versa. Instead, they summarise that one may consider replacing the constitutional court’s ‘constitutional’  
      approach to vicarious liability with direct liability as the requirement of a sufficiently close connection in vicarious liability  
      cases which deal with rape is over extended. 
186  Para 125. 
187  Para 136. 
188  Para 137. 
189  Para 146. 
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4.3.3 (3) Minority Judgment 
Yacoob J, with Jafta J concurring, found that the Minister was not vicariously liable. They 
found that the test for vicarious liability was laid down in K and that unless the court holds 
that this particular case was decided incorrectly, the flexible test in K should be applied. 
They found that Van Wyk ‘had not been on duty, either subjectively or objectively’.191 They 
also found that it is not a decisive factor whether a policeman is on or off duty but, according 
to the minority, Van Wyk was on a ‘frolic of his own.’192 There was ‘no official police promise 
of safe carriage.’193 The learned judges conclude that there were no reasonable grounds for 
Ms F to trust Van Wyk and she had every reason to distrust him and went with him because 
she was in a desperate situation.194  
On the matter of a simultaneous commission and omission, the minority argued that neither 
existed because Van Wyk was not on duty.195 In the circumstances they conclude that there 
was not a sufficient connection between Van Wyk’s deeds and his employment as a 
policeman.196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________ 
190   Para 148. 
191   Para 155. 
192   Para 168. 
193   Para 169. 
194   Paras 173-174.  
195   Para 175. 
196   Para 177.  
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                                                                   CHAPTER 5 
CHAPTER 5.1 
Observations 
From the Constitutional Court cases various observations may be made. It does seem that 
government liability cases are on the rise and some do involve violent conduct by policemen 
such as the one in Van Wyk. 
The first observation is that vicarious liability serves a purpose in our society when properly 
applied. The majority judgement in F cannot be faulted. The sentiments of Neethling after the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision and before the Constitutional Court’s judgment are that: 
‘[t]he only difference between K and F was that in K the policemen were on duty when raping K, while in F 
the rapist was on stand-by duty. The core question in F was therefore whether a policeman on stand-by 
duty is on par with a policeman on duty so that according to the standard test for vicarious liability he can 
be found to have acted within the course and scope of his employment when raping a woman while on 
stand-by duty. ’197  
 
 
Mogoeng J et al came to the conclusion on the facts that all the elements of vicarious liability 
had been proven. There is a place for vicarious liability in South African law even though it is 
a well-known fact that this enables a plaintiff to recover his damages from a defendant who is 
not a so-called ‘man of straw’.198 Where all the elements of vicarious liability had been 
proven, the employer should be held liable. 
The second observation is that control should not be confused with the course and scope of 
employment. It is true that control is a factor that is taken into consideration in establishing 
whether an employer-employee relationship did exist or whether a sufficiently-close 
relationship existed between the conduct of the employee and his employment. Control 
cannot be compared to scope of employment because a wrongdoer was not under the   
 
 
 
_________________ 
197  2011 Obiter 428 438. 
198  Potgieter 2011 Obiter 189 191 
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control of his employer, the wrongdoer could still have acted within the course and scope of 
his employment.199  
The third observation is that although a majority of the Constitutional Court had re-affirmed 
the basis of vicarious liability in the employer-employee relationship, it is useful and 
necessary to consider the alternative to vicarious liability as suggested by Froneman 
J.200 Although Froneman J agrees with the majority in holding the Minister liable, he finds that 
the basis for liability in casu is direct - as opposed to vicarious - liability. This is strange, as 
direct liability of the state had been severely criticised before.201 This makes the findings by 
Froneman J and the reasons for his judgment arguably questionable. The question can be 
asked whether direct liability is only a possibility in cases involving the state or is it a 
possibility for all actions against employers. 
It is trite law that in order for a defendant to be liable in delict, the plaintiff needs to prove on a 
balance of probabilities that the defendant had committed a wrongful, culpable act which 
caused damage to the plaintiff.202 Conduct for purposes of delictual liability may be in the 
form of a commission or an omission. State organs may be liable for positive acts (such as 
the confiscation of property or the poisoning of residents’ water). It is evident that actionable 
omissions will include instances where a state organ had a legal duty to act positively to 
prevent harm.203 Liability will be established if an omission is found to be wrongful. The 
finding of wrongfulness is established with reference to the legal convictions of the 
community or the boni mores.204 In Carmichele,205 the Constitutional Court found that an 
omission can place a legal duty on the state to take positive steps to protect fundamental 
rights, such as the right to life, human dignity and freedom and security of the person as 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.206 Failure to do so would be wrongful. In addition to conduct 
 
______________ 
 
199  See 3.1.2 above.  
200   Para 109. 
201   Neethling 2011 Obiter 428 437-438. 
202   Neethling et al 4. 
203   Op cit 30, 57, 76-77. 
204   Op cit 57. 
205   2001 (4) SA 938 (CC).  
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having to be wrongful, it should also be culpable. There is a distinction between intent and 
negligence as forms of fault.207 To establish intent, there should be the direction of the will 
and consciousness of wrongfulness and the test for intent is subjective.208 Negligence is 
where a person is blamed for an attitude of carelessness, thoughtlessness because he or 
she failed to adhere to the objective standard of care required and the test for negligence is 
that of the reasonable person or bonus paterfamilias.209 Therefore, a diligent paterfamilias or 
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would be able to foresee the reasonable 
possibility of his conduct injuring another and he or she would take reasonable steps to 
prevent harm. Where the defendant had failed to take such steps, he or she would have 
acted negligently.210  
Froneman J found that the state is a legal person211 and as such should perform the 
functions entrusted to it by the Constitution.212 On the issue of the act as a delictual element, 
acts of state organs such as the police are acts of the state213 and failures to act positively 
where there is a constitutional duty to do so, constitutes wrongfulness.214 Froneman 
effectively uses Carmichele in finding that the constitutional value of accountability is here 
the boni mores and constitutional values should be taken into account in establishing 
wrongfulness. 
 
 
 
 
___________________ 
206   Paras 27-29 and 72-74. See also Neethling, Potgieter & Scott Case book on the Law of delict (2006) 26.  
207   Neethling et al 123. 
208   Op cit 126. 
219   Op cit 131. 
210   Kruger v Coetzee 1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430; Neethling et al 133. 
211   Para 109. See also Okpaluba & Osode Government Liability: South Africa and the Commonwealth (2010) 16. 
212   Ibid. 
213   Ibid. 
214    Para 121 
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Van Wyk had the intention to rape Ms F and fault in the form of intent was present, but 
Froneman J found Van Wyk to be also negligent. Froneman J found that the state was 
negligent in not taking reasonable measures to prevent Van Wyk from committing a delict, 
although his previous convictions made him a human time bomb and the court found it was 
foreseeable that he could cause harm to members of the public. The state’s failure to take 
reasonable steps to prevent Van Wyk from causing harm is indicative of the state’s 
negligence. If the Minister had proper policies in place to discipline Van Wyk, he would not 
have been in possession of the police vehicle and could not have offered Ms F a lift home. If 
the wrongful, culpable act of the state then caused harm to a victim such as Ms F, there is no 
reason why she should not be able to hold the Minister directly liable. 
According to Wiechers, the legal basis for holding the state liable for the actions of its 
employees lies in the risk theory, which means that if an employer empowers his employees 
to perform certain functions, he must bear the risk that those employees may cause damage 
to individuals.215 In addition, the state’s mandate is to serve the citizens of South Africa in 
accordance with the Constitution. The principle of Batho Pele216 indicates that the idea of 
service is central to the government’s functions. Consequently, a government body has the 
duty not to infringe any of the human rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and in the case of 
an omission, there may even be a duty on the state to take positive steps to protect these 
rights.217 
By employing unsuitable individuals such as Van Wyk, the state runs the risk of being held 
liable, on the basis of vicarious liability and also on the basis of directly liability. 
 
 
 
______________ 
215   Wiechers Administrative Law (1985) page number as quoted by Olivier “Delictual liability of the South African Revenue  
       Service: The wrongfulness element” 2009 TSAR 740 744. 
216   Batho Pele means ‘people first’ and these principles are access, which means to offer integrated service delivery,  
       openness and transparency, which means to create a culture of collaboration, consultation, which means to listen to the  
       customer’s problems, redress, which means to apologise when necessary. In addition there are the principles of courtesy,  
       service standards, information and value for money. See http://www.info.gov.za (accessed on 2012-03-21). 
217   Carmichele par 1 
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CHAPTER 5.2 
                                                Conclusion 
In the NK case the Constitutional Court held that, in the light of the policy laden character of 
vicarious liability, the application of the rules of vicarious liability cannot only be a factual 
issue. Policy considerations such as deterrence and a fair and adequate remedy to the 
victim, fairness to the employer and, most importantly, the normative influence of the 
Constitution, have to be taken into consideration. 
The Constitutional Court developed the objective stage of the close connection test for 
vicarious liability of an employer formulated in the Rabie case to encompass mixed elements 
of fact and law. The elements of law entail that the court is required to view the question of 
whether the employer should be held liable through the prism of constitutional norms. 
According to the Court, this test is wide enough to include other norms (not embodied in the 
Constitution) as well. The difficulty is that the test, as applied to the facts of the case, does 
not provide any guidance on how it should be applied in other cases where constitutional 
issues are not as prominent. 
The Canadian Supreme Court in Bazley v Curry held that there would only be a close 
connection between the wrongful act and the business in the case of a risk created or 
substantially enhanced by the employer’s business. Only in those circumstances would 
holding the employer liable serve the twin goals of adequate compensation and deterrence. 
This approach was followed in South Africa in Grobler v Naspers. The Constitutional Court in 
the NK case steered away from enterprise risk as the basis for vicarious liability and 
formulated a test that focuses on the duties of the employer and employee and the position 
of authority and trust that was conducive to abuse. This basis for vicarious liability is closer to 
the test for a close connection as formulated and applied in the UK case of Lister v Hesley 
Hall in which the Court emphasised the duties of the employer and the employee and the 
connection between the wrongful act of the employee and the authorised acts of the 
employee. These two approaches may not be that wide apart as courts will have to look 
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closely at the specific duties of the employee to establish whether the employer’s enter-prise 
did indeed pose a risk that the particular kind of wrongful act could take place. When the 
constitutional dimension of the test in the NK case is left aside, it is clear that the close 
connection test is very similar to that applied in other common law countries. The test 
formulated in the NK case can be interpreted to mean that where the employee was 
empowered with authority to perform a certain duty, and the employee was placed in a 
position of authority and trust that was conducive to abuse, the breach of that duty may 
render the employer liable in cases of intentional wrongdoing. According to the NK case, the 
court must in each case decide whether the case before it is one in which the employer must 
in principle be held liable. Constitutional and other norms must therefore be taken into 
account in each case. A very positive aspect of the test is that the Court did not adhere to 
semantics, but held that the test is a policy decision that is based on values. However, it will 
be difficult to establish the limits of this liability to ensure that the State does not become an 
involuntary insurer based on a type of non-delegable duty. The application of this test to non-
constitutional cases also poses certain difficulties. The solution to these problems would 
again lie in following the developments in Canada, the United Kingdom and South Africa, in 
focusing on the specific duties of the employee or the risk brought about by the undertaking. 
In practice, this proposal means that a plaintiff who sues the state has the option of pleading 
the elements of vicarious liability and, in the alternative, direct liability, or vice versa. The time 
has come to accept that there is no basis for denying a plaintiff an action against the state 
based on direct liability. With direct liability, the factual and normative enquiry is evident in 
the test for wrongfulness, whereas the same factual and normative enquiry takes place in 
establishing ‘course and scope of employment’ in vicarious liability. 
It is submitted that Froneman J’s judgment paves the way for recognising the possibility of 
direct liability and that the time is ripe for employing that particular cause of action. Although 
this is not the function of the law of delict, it may be that a positive spin-off of direct liability 
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may be that it would serve as a deterrent for state organs and that they would make a 
greater effort to take reasonable steps to ensure that they perform their constitutional duties. 
Grave concerns about the state of the police service are not groundless. Typically, 
employers in general terms can only discipline or take action against employees when their 
misconduct is within the work context, except where the employer can prove that the off-duty 
misconduct impacts on its business. As pointed out by Neethling, the right to control is not 
only applicable when a policeman is on duty but can also be extended to situations when 
they are on standby-duty or even when they are off-duty and then place themselves on duty 
and commit a delict. It is submitted that Neethling is correct: the creation of risk approach 
should be considered in all instances of intentional wrongdoing by an employee and the 
general guideline should be that: ‘... an employer should be liable for an (intentional) delict of 
his employee if his appointment and work conditions enabled him to commit the delict (and 
hence created a heightened risk of prejudice) in such a manner.’. This should compel 
employers (especially the state), to take active steps to prevent employees working for them 
from causing harm to others (and the public at large). If the state as an employer takes 
proper steps in curbing such behaviour and dismiss employees who abuse their authority 
and trust, then instances such as F or K will not be the order of the day. Accountability is 
ultimately the responsibility of the employer (in most instances the state) and the saying ‘I am 
not my brother’s keeper’ will not be applicable because it already has been established in 
Feldman that a master who uses servants creates risk of harm to others if the servant is 
negligent, inefficient or untrustworthy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  62 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
LEGISLATION 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996  
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997  
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993  
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998  
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995  
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000  
 
1.  
CASE LAW 
SOUTH AFRICAN CASES 
B  
Bezuidenhout NO v Eskom 2003 24 ILJ 1084 (SCA).  
 
C 
Commissioner for the SA Revenue Service v TFN Diamond Cutting works 2005  
26 ILJ 1391 (SCA). 
 
E 
Ess Kay Electronics v First National Bank 2001 1 SA 1214 (SCA). 
 
F  
Feldman v Mall 1945 AD 733. 
F v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 606 (WCC). 
 
G  
Grobler v Naspers Bpk en ‘n ander 2004 (4) SA 220 (C).  
 
H  
Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC).  
 
J  
J v M Ltd 1989 10 ILJ 755 (IC). 
 
L 
Lipka v Voltex PE 2010 31 ILJ 2199 (CCMA)  
Luiters v Minister of Safety and Security 2007 3 BCLR 287 (CC). 
 
K  
K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 26 ILJ 681 (SCA) 
Kern v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 41 (CC).  
 
M  
Media24 v Grobler 2005 6 SA 328 (SCA). 
 
                                                                                                                                  63 
 
Mhlongo and Another NO v Minister of Police 1978 2 SA 551 (A). 
Midway Two Engineering & Construction Services v Transnet Bpk  
1998 3 SA 17 (SCA).  
Minister of Finance v Gore 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA). 
Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 1 SA 117 (A). 
Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2001 4 SA 938 (CC). 
Minister of Safety and Security v F (592/09) [2011] ZASCA 3 (22 February 2011). 
Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA). 
Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit v Japmoco BK h/a Status Motors 2002 5 SA 649 (SCA). 
Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382 390 
 
N  
NK v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 26 ILJ 1205 (CC). 
Ntsabo v Real Security CC 2003 24 ILJ 2341 (LC).  
 
P 
Phoebus Apollo Aviation CC v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 2 SA 34 (CC).  
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 1 SACR 567 (CC). 
 
S 
Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2007 28 ILJ 2405 (CC)  
 
V  
Viljoen v Smith 1997 1 SA 309 (A) 
Van Deventer v Workman’s Compensation Commissioner 1962 (4) SA 28 (T).  
Vigario v Afrox Ltd 1996 (3) SA 450 (W). 
 
 
FOREIGN CASES 
B  
Bazley v Curry 1999 2 SCR 534 
B(E) v Order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (British Columbia) 2005 SCC 60 
 
J  
Jacobi v Griffiths 1999 2 SCR 570 
 
L  
Lister and others v Hesley Hall [2001] UKHL 22 (UK) 
 
N  
New South Wales v Lepore; Samin v Queensland; Rich v Queensland 2003 HCA 4  
 
R  
Rose v Plenty 1976 1 All ER 97 
 
T  
Trotman v North Yorkshire CC 1999 LGR 584 CA 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  64 
 
LIST OF SOURCES 
BOOKS 
A  
Ayitah “Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts” (1967) 175  
 
B  
Burchell “Principles of Delict” (1993) 10 
Baxter Administrative law (1984) 63-632  
 
C  
Cheadle et al “South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights” (2002) 1-2  
 
D  
Daekin et al “Markesins and Daekin‟s Tort Law” (2003) 583  
De Waal et al “The Bill of Rights Handbook” 4th ed (2001) 55-57  
Dupper et al “Essential Employment Discrimination Law” 2004 36 
Dupper, O and Garbers, C “Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 – Employment 
Du Toit, D; Bosch, D; Woolfrey, D; Godfrey, S; Rossouw, J; Christie, S; Cooper, C; Giles, G 
and Bosch, C Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide Durban, LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2003. 
Discrimination: a Commentary” in Thompson & Benjamin Labour Law (Revision Service 43, 
2002). 
 
F 
Finnemore, M and Van Rensburg, R Contemporary Labour Relations Durban, LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2002.  
 
H  
Harrison & Lee “Love at Work” (1986) Personnel Management January 20  
Hart “Law, Liberty and Morality” (1963) 
Heuston & Buckley (eds)  
 
L  
Le Roux et al “Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law, Policies and Processes” (2005) 15 
Le Roux, R; Orleyn, T and Rycroft, A Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Durban, 
LexisNexis Butterworths 2005  
Loubser et al “The Law of Delict in South Africa” (2010) 137  
 
M  
Meer “Black Women-Workers” (1991) at 37-8  
 
N 
Neethling et al “Law of Delict” (2006) 4ed 49 35ff, 47, 50ff, 55ff 
Neethling, J Potgieter, JM and Visser, PJ Law of Delict 4
th 
edition Durban, LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2001 
Neethling, Potgieter & Scott Case book on the Law of delict (2006) 26  
Nieva & Gutek “Women and Work; A Psychological Perspective” (1981) 63  
 
R  
Ryder “Devising a Sexual Harassment Policy” (1998) People Dynamics 27  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  65 
 
V  
Van der Walt & Midgely Delict: Principles and Cases (1997) 54ff 70 
Van Niekerk, Christianson, McGregor, Smit & Van Eck Law@work (2012) 269  
 
S 
Scott S 34(1) & (2) BCEA 
 
 
JOURNALS  
 
B 
Basson “Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An Overview of Developments” (2007) 3 Stell 
LR 445  
Brand “Reflections on Wrongfulness in the Law of Delict” (2006) SALJ 76 77  
Brassey “The Nature of Employment” (1990) 11 ILJ 889  
 
C 
Calitz “Vicarious Liability of Employers: Reconsidering Risk as the Basis for Liability” (2005) 
3 TSAR 216, 226  
Calitz “The Liability of Employers For The Harassment of Employees By Non-Employees” 
(2009) 3 Stell LR 407 421  
Cooper, C “Harassment on the Basis of Sex and Gender: A Form of Unfair Discrimination” 
(2002) 23 ILJ 1  
Cooper C “Harassment on the Basis of Sex and Gender: A Form of Unfair Discrimination” 
2002 Industrial Law Journal Vol 23, 1 
 
D 
Dolkart “Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity and the Shaping of Legal 
Standards” (1994) 43 Emory LJ 151 187-188  
Duff “Vicarious Liability: Can the Employer Be Blamed” (2010) Pharmaceutical & Cosmetic 
Review May  
 
E 
Erasmus, BJ; Grobler, PA and Kölkenbeck-Ruh RK “A model for the management of sexual 
harassment in South African companies” 2003 Vol 12(1) Management Dynamics 38 
 
G 
Gule “Employers‟ Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment” (2002) Vol 13 Part 2 JBL 66 
 
H 
Halfkenny “Legal and Workplace Solutions to Sexual Harassment in South Africa (Part 2): 
The South African Experience” (1996) 17 ILJ 213 
Husbands “Sexual Harassment Law in Employment: An International Perspective” (1992) 
131 I LR 535 535-6   
 
L 
Lawlor “Vicarious and Direct Liability of an Employer for Sexual Harassment” 39  
Le Roux “Two Roads to an Employer‟s Vicarious Liability For Sexual Harassment: S Grobler 
v Naspers Bpk EN‟N Ander and Ntsabo v Real Security CC (2005) ILJ 1907  
Le Roux “Vicarious Liability: Revisiting an Old Acquaintance” (2003) 24 ILJ 1879 1882 71 
Le Roux “Section 60 of the Employment Equity Act of 1998: Will A Comparative Approach 
Shake This Joker Out of The Pack” (2006) 27 3 Obiter 411  
Loots “Sexual Harassment and Vicarious Liability: A Warning to Political Parties” (2008) 1 
Stell LR 143 146  
 
                                                                                                                                  66 
 
 
M 
Mowatt, JG “Sexual Harassment – New Remedy for an Old Wrong” 1986 Vol 7 Industrial 
Law Journal 637 
Mukheibir “The Impact of the Constitutional Imperative of the State to Avoid Harm on 
Delictual Liability for an Omission” (2003) Obiter 498 503 
Manamela “Employee and Independent Contractor: The Distinction Stands” (2002) 14 SA 
Merc LJ 107  
Modiba “Who Should Be Liable?” (2002) Vol 11 Part 2 JBL 114  
Mowatt “Sexual Harassment - New Remedy for an Old Wrong” (1986) 7 Part 4 ILJ 652  
Mowatt “Sexual Harassment-Old Remedies for a New Wrong” (1987) ILJ 439 
Mukheibir & Ristow “An Overview of Sexual Harassment: Liability of the Employer” (2006) 27 
2 Obiter 248   
 
N 
Neethling ‘Vicarious Liability of the State for Rape by a Police Official’ 2011 TSAR 186 
Neethling 2011 TSAR 189. Scott’s (2011 TSAR 145) 
Neethling “Delictual Protection of the Right to Bodily Integrity and Security of the Person 
Against Omissions by the State” (2008) SALJ 572 579  
Nieva & Gutek “Women and Work; A Psychological Perspective” (1981) 63 
 
O 
Olivier “Delictual Liability of the South African Revenue Service” (2009) 4 TSAR 740 741  
 
R 
Reaching the Pinnacle: Principles, Policies and People for a Single Apex Court in South 
Africa’ 2005 SAJHR 509 
 
S 
Smit N and Van der Nest D “When sisters are doing it for themselves: sexual harassment 
claims in the workplace” 2004 Vol 3 TSAR 531 
Smit “When Sisters Are Doing It for Themselves: Sexual Harassment Claims in the 
Workplace” (2004) TSAR 521 528  
Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts 21 ed (1996) 443 
Scott “Middellike Aanspreeklikheid van die Staat vir Misdadige Polisie-optrede: Die Heilsame 
Ontwikkeling Duur Voort: F v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 606 (WKK)” 2011 
TSAR 135 135-147 
 
V 
Venter “Liability for Sexual Harassment” (2000) September WP 50 51  
"Vicarious harassment - Employers Become Reluctant Ensurers" 2004 20(4) Employment 
Law 
Von Bonde “State Liability Vis-A- Vis Victims of Crime in Post-1994 South African Case Law 
–Something New Or a Reinvented Wheel?” (2009) Obiter 211 219 72  
 
W 
Wicke “Vicarious Liability: Not Simply A Matter of Legal Policy” (1998) 1 Stell LR 21 
Wiechers Administrative Law (1985) page number as quoted by Olivier “Delictual liability of 
the South African Revenue Service: The wrongfulness element” 2009 TSAR 740 744. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  67 
 
WEBSITES 
H 
http://www.info.gov.za (last accessed on 10 September 2013) 
 
P 
Pretoria News Retrieved on 04 /06 2004 from http://www.pretorianews.co.za/index. 
php?fSectionId= 665&fArticleId=2099823  
 
W 
Wikipedia online dictionary http://www.wikipedia.org:public policy (last accessed on 23 
September 2013) 
 
 
 
                                               _________________________ 
